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A large share of the more than $6.28 trillion in private pension plan 
assets is held in certain types of indirect investment vehicles. If those 
vehicles file their own annual return with the Department of Labor they are 
called “direct filing entities” (or DFEs), and pension plans that invest in 
them are excused from providing detailed information concerning the 
assets, liabilities, and investment performance of the DFEs. Consequently, 
the publicly-available summary financial information reported by pension 
plans investing through one or more DFEs is seriously incomplete: while a 
plan must identify the categorical nature of its direct investments (for 
example, as common or preferred stock, corporate or government debt, real 
estate, etc.), indirect investments through a DFE are reported only as 
interests in the DFE, without regard to the underlying nature of the DFE’s 
assets and liabilities. Matching the DFE’s return with the returns filed by 
plans that invest through the DFE is theoretically possible, but it is 
technically difficult and has not been comprehensively achieved. 
This study undertakes the task of linking returns filed by large private 
pension plans and DFEs in 2008. After explaining the types of DFEs, 
summary statistics on the extent of pension plan investment through DFEs 
and the composition of DFE portfolios are reported. The process employed 
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to link the holdings of each DFE to its investor-plans is described, followed 
by description and analysis of the results. Important differences in the asset 
allocations of pension plans of various types are revealed, and the portfolio 
compositions of plans that do and do not invest through DFEs are 
compared. Because thirty-five percent of plans that invest in a DFE are 
found to file internally inconsistent returns that preclude successful linking 
of DFE financial information to the investor-plan, the plan characteristics 
associated with such deficient filings are investigated. Although the 
composition of DFE portfolios is currently invisible to plan participants 
and the general public, we find little evidence that DFEs have been 
systematically exploited to obscure the identity of pension plan investments. 
Finally, the results of this study are reviewed in light of the purposes of 
pension plan financial disclosure. Even if routine, accurate, and 
comprehensive matching of DFE financial information with investor-plans 
were available, ERISA’s text and policies support the regulatory 
formulation of a far more detailed digital disclosure regime. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Funds accumulated in private pension plans now exceed $6.28 trillion 
in the aggregate.
1
 This vast store represents a large share of the retirement
savings of American workers, both active and retired.
2
 How are those
pension funds invested? Despite annual financial reporting requirements 
imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA),
3
 we don’t know. Nor is the U.S. Department of Labor, which
administers the ERISA’s reporting and disclosure regime, able to shed 
much light on the matter.
4
 The problem lies in a failure to connect the dots.
1
 EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. (EBSA), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN 
BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2010 FORM 5500 ANNUAL REPORTS 3 tbl.A1 (2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2010pensionplanbulletin.pdf. The 2010 data are the first to 
report full recoupment of the 23 percent decline in total private pension plan assets that 
occurred between 2007 and 2008 ($6.1 trillion in 2007 to $4.7 trillion in 2008), apparently 
due to the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis and the attendant recession. EBSA, 
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 13 tbl.E11, 14 graph 
E11g (2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf. 
2
 In 2010 individual retirement accounts (IRAs) were estimated to hold another $4.8 
trillion of retirement savings. PROQUEST, LLC, PROQUEST STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013, 777 tbl.1229 (2013). While IRAs were originally designed to make 
tax-favored retirement savings available to workers who are not covered by an employer-
sponsored pension plan (about half of the U.S. labor force), the largest share of IRA assets, 
43.2% in 2010, is traceable to tax-free rollovers from private pension plans rather than to 
individual contributions. Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), Issue Brief No. 375: 
Individual Account Retirement Plans: An Analysis of the 2010 Survey of Consumer 
Finances, EBRI.ORG, 21 fig.13a (Sept. 2012), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_ 
09-2012_No375_IndvAccts.pdf. 
The single largest source of retirement income for most Americans is Social Security. 
In 2010, 65 percent of elderly households (married couples and nonmarried persons age 65 
or older) obtained at least 50 percent of their total income from Social Security. SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA), INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, 2010, at 9 (2012), 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/income_aged/2010/iac10.pdf. 
3
 Annual reports are mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA)  §§ 101(b), 104(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(b), 1024(a) (2012), and are required to 
contain the financial information set forth in ERISA § 103, 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (2012). Reports 
are filed using the Form 5500 Series, “Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan” and 
required schedules, instruments which were jointly developed by the Department of Labor, 
the Internal Revenue Service (Service), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC), to satisfy annual reporting requirements under ERISA Title I (administered by 
Department of Labor), Title IV (the termination insurance program for defined benefit 
pension plans, administered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation), and the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code) (administered by the Service). 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1 (2012). 
4
 As explained below, the information gap stems from the difficulty of attributing 
assets held by various indirect investment vehicles, known as direct filing entities or DFEs, 
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Large private pension plans, meaning plans covering 100 or more 
participants at the start of the plan year, annually report summary balance 
sheet (asset and liability) and income statement (earnings and expenses) 
information on Form 5500, Schedule H.
5
 These plans commonly invest a
large share of their assets in various collective investment vehicles, 
including common trust funds managed by banks, trust companies, or 
similar institutions, pooled separate accounts sponsored by insurance 
companies, and master trusts, which facilitate joint investment of the assets 
of more than one plan sponsored either by a single employer or by a group 
of commonly controlled employers.
6
 Some of these collective investment
vehicles are permitted or required to file their own annual reports with 
accompanying financial information (Form 5500 and Schedule H), and are 
referred to as “direct filing entities” (DFEs). A pension plan that invests 
through a DFE need only report its interest in the entity; the investor-plan is 
excused from providing detailed information about the underlying assets, 
liabilities, and transactions of the DFE.
7
 Thus, the annual return of a
pension plan that invests some of its funds in a DFE will show its direct 
investments in stocks, bonds, real estate, and other asset categories, and will 
to the pension plans that invest through those vehicles. The Director of Research of 
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) told one of the authors: “I caution you 
that in practice making the links [between pension plans and the DFEs in which they hold 
interests] can be complicated. We have made some efforts along those lines but that remains 
an unfinished project here.” Email from Joseph Piacentini to Peter Wiedenbeck (July 13, 
2010, 1:38 PM). In April 2012, the Department of Labor released its first statistical overview 
of DFEs. EBSA, FORM 5500 DIRECT FILING ENTITY BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2008 FORM 
5500 ANNUAL REPORTS (Mar. 2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
directfilingentity2008.pdf (ver. 1.0, designated “Preliminary”). The Department of Labor 
report consists of twelve tables of aggregate statistics, unaccompanied by any explanation of 
methodology or analysis. 
5
 ERISA § 103(b)(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(2), (3) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-
1(b) (2012). 
6
29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1(e) (2012). 
7
 ERISA § 103(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(4) (2012) (statutory authority to relax 
reporting requirements for plan assets held in either a common trust fund maintained by a 
bank or similar institution, or a pooled separate account maintained by an insurance carrier); 
29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-9 (2012) (regulatory exemption for investor-plans allowing them to 
dispense with reporting financial information on the underlying assets and liabilities of 
common trust fund or pooled separate account if the bank or insurance carrier files a Form 
5500, including Schedule D and Schedule H, covering the common trust fund or pooled 
separate account). Accord 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-3(c)(2) (current value of investor-plan’s 
proportionate interest in underlying assets and liabilities of common trust fund, along with 
other financial information, must be reported if the trust does not file Form 5500), 2520.103-
4(c)(2) (same for investor-plan’s interest in insurance company pooled separate account) 
(2012). 
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report its interest in any DFEs, but will not disclose the underlying holdings 
of the DFE. The DFE’s return will of course report a categorical breakdown 
of its assets and liabilities, but linking the DFE’s investments with its 
investor-plan’s presents the challenge. Without such a link we lack a 
composite picture of a pension plan’s direct and indirect holdings of various 
categories of assets and liabilities, effectively rendering part of the plan’s 
financial position invisible, in the sense that plan participants, federal 
regulators, policy analysts, and the public at large cannot “see” the 
characteristics of indirect investments held in DFEs, nor evaluate the 
composition of the plan’s overall portfolio. 
Just how serious is the resulting gap in our knowledge? How concerned 
should we be about the inability to look inside the black box of DFEs? 
When it comes to readily available public information on the allocation of 
private pension plan investments, we are astonishingly ignorant. Figure 1 
shows that in 2010 large single-employer defined benefit plans had invested 
64.3% of their total assets, on average, in four types of DFEs: master trusts 
(49.4%), bank common trust funds (11.7%), 103-12 investment entities 
(1.8%), and insurance company pooled separate accounts (1.4%). Thus, a 
majority of the assets of large single-employer defined benefit plans are 
reported only as undifferentiated indirect investments made through DFEs. 
Figure 2 shows the corresponding breakdown for large single-employer 
defined contribution plans in 2010. They held 33.8%, or more than one-
third of their total assets, on average, in master trusts (20.4%), bank 
common trust funds (9.9%), and insurance company pooled separate 
accounts (3.5%). The single largest slice of defined contribution plan assets 
in 2010 is the 42.1% invested in registered investment companies (mutual 
funds). These mutual fund holdings have increased substantially since the 
early 1990s, apparently due to the growth of 401(k) plans that call for 
participant-directed investments; such plans typically allow participants to 
select from a menu of mutual fund investment options.
8
 
  
 
 
8
 See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2012). 
Mutual fund investments are also common under a special type of defined contribution 
pension plan that covers employees of charitable organizations or public schools. These so-
called “403(b) plans” (exemplified by TIAA-CREF) may only invest in annuity contracts or 
mutual fund shares. I.R.C. §§ 403(b)(7), 851(a). 
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Each DFE’s assets and liabilities can in principle be attributed in 
proper proportion to the pension plans investing through that collective 
investment vehicle. Form 5500 Schedule D, entitled “DFE/Participating 
Plan Information,” is designed to elicit the information necessary to connect 
the dots. A plan that invests in one or more DFEs is required to report on 
Schedule D information about its interest in each such DFE, including the 
name and identifying information of the DFE, the type of DFE (e.g., master 
trust investment account, common trust fund, or pooled separate account), 
and the dollar value of the plan’s interest in the DFE as of the end of the 
year.
9
 The DFE, in turn, must disclose the name and identifying information 
of each plan that invested in the DFE at any time during the year.
10
 Linking 
the two data sets presents certain data quality and programming challenges. 
This paper describes a project to associate DFE asset holdings with the 
pension plans investing in the DFE based upon returns filed for reporting 
years ending in 2008. The paper first reports the size and composition of 
DFE investments, and then turns to investigate the extent to which the 
composition of pension plan asset holdings, including those held indirectly 
through DFEs, vary according to a number of plan characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part II, following this introduction, 
provides additional background information on pension plan reporting 
requirements and how they relate to collective investment vehicles. That 
discussion exposes the limits of existing publicly available information on 
pension investments. Part III briefly describes the methodology used to link 
DFE asset and liability data to the balance sheets of investor-plans. Part IV 
reports the results for 2008 and highlights and discusses interesting 
correlations between pension plan characteristics and investment 
allocations. Part V assesses the current state of pension plan financial 
disclosure from the standpoint of ERISA’s policies. A brief conclusion 
summarizes the study’s principal findings and suggests avenues for further 
 
 
9
 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FORM 5500, 
SCHEDULE D, DFE/PARTICIPATING PLAN INFORMATION, Part I (2008), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-Schedule-D-mp.pdf (“Information on Interests in 
MTIAs, CCTs, PSAs, and 103-12 IEs”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. 
ADMIN. & PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., FORM 5500, INSTRUCTIONS, at 11-13, 25 
(2008), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500inst.pdf [hereinafter 2008 INSTRUCTIONS]. 29 
C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-3(c)(1) (plan must identify DFE and report current value of its 
investment or units of participation in the common trust fund), -4(c)(1) (same for pooled 
separate accounts), -12(a) (same for so-called “103-12 investment entities”) (2012). 
 
10
 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FORM 5500, 
SCHEDULE D, DFE/PARTICIPATING PLAN INFORMATION, Part II (2008) (“Information on 
Participating Plans”), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-Schedule-D-mp.pdf; 2008 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 11-13, 25. 
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investigation. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  History and Policy 
Financial disclosure was the focus of the first federal foray into the 
regulation of employee benefit plans. In the 1950s a number of state and 
federal investigations into labor racketeering uncovered notorious examples 
of embezzlement and abuse of employee benefit funds by union officials.
11
 
Most instances of misconduct involved multiemployer welfare funds; 
although jointly managed by representatives of contributing employers and 
labor organizations under the Taft-Hartley Act, in practice these funds often 
came to be dominated by union officers. President Eisenhower 
recommended a congressional study of pension and welfare benefit plans in 
1954 and put forward draft legislation in 1956 to require benefit plans to 
report their terms and finances to the Department of Labor. Fortified by 
public outrage over corrupt practices revealed by the McClelland 
committee’s investigations in 1957-1959, proponents of federal regulation 
pushed through the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 
(WPPDA). The objective of disclosure was to deter abuses and promote 
self-policing by employees, assisted by the press. Yet as originally enacted, 
the core financial information required in the annual report was limited to a 
“summary statement of assets, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements of the 
plan.”
12
 The WPPDA imposed reporting obligations on both multiemployer 
and single-employer (company-managed) plans, but withheld investigative 
and enforcement authority from the Department of Labor. In signing the bill 
President Eisenhower lamented that it accomplished little more than 
“establish[ing] a precedent of Federal responsibility in this area.”
13
 
The Kennedy Administration took up the cause, championing 
 
 
11
 See generally, JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY 
ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 45–50 (2004). S. REP. NO. 85-1440, at 2, 3 (1958), 
reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WELFARE AND PENSION 
PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1958, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 87-420 OF 1962, at 73–74 
(1962) [hereinafter WPPDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
 
12
 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA), Pub. L. No. 85-836, § 7(b), 
72 Stat. 997, 1000 (1958). Certain conflict of interest transactions involving pension plans 
were required to be listed in detail, including investments in securities or properties of the 
employer, the union, or plan officials, and fund loans made to such parties. Id. § 7(f)(1)(C), 
(D). 
 
13
 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER: 
1958, at 663 (1959). 
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legislation to strengthen the disclosure act.
14
 The 1962 WPPDA 
amendments gave the Department of Labor investigative authority and the 
right to sue to enjoin violations, made false statements and concealment of 
facts relating to disclosure obligations a federal crime,
15
 and in place of the 
“summary statement of assets” required that the annual report specify “the 
total amount in each of the following types of assets: cash, government 
bonds, non-government bonds and debentures, common stocks, preferred 
stocks, common trust funds, real estate loans and mortgages, operated real 
estate, other real estate, and other assets.”
16
 Routine disclosure of broad 
categories of investments was as far as Congress was prepared to go; the 
Secretary of Labor was authorized to demand an itemized report of all 
investments only if he found reasonable cause to believe that investigation 
would uncover violations of the act.
17
 
Even as amended in 1962, the WPPDA imposed no federal standards 
of investment propriety or fiduciary conduct on employee benefit plan 
administrators,
18
 so the limited disclosure it demanded merely provided 
access to information that might help workers vindicate their rights under 
state contract or trust law. Plan participants’ state law rights, however, were 
often severely restricted by the terms of the plan.
19
 That ended in 1974, 
 
 
14
 WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 81–83, 98. 
 
15
 18 U.S.C. § 1027 (2012). The 1962 amendments also made theft or embezzlement 
from an employee benefit fund a federal crime, and outlawed soliciting or receiving bribes or 
kickbacks to influence the operation of an employee benefit plan, 18 U.S.C. §§ 664, 1954 
(2012). 
 
16
 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
420, § 9, 76 Stat. 35, 36. 
 
17
 S. REP. NO. 87-908, at 7, 18 (1961); H.R. REP. NO. 87-998, at 9, 11–12 (1961). 
There were people who wanted the Secretary of Labor to have the power to make 
the report include all types of investments — how much stock there was in 
General Motors or General Electric, or any other corporation. We resisted this 
move. We felt that what was necessary here was a general disclosure of the broad 
category of investments. 
108 CONG. REC. 1735 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Goodell). Accord, id. at 1736, reprinted in 
WPPDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 393–95. 
 
18
 108 CONG. REC. 1735 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Goodell) (“[T]here shall be no 
powers given to anyone to control any investment policies in these pension and welfare 
funds.”); id. at 1736. 
 
19
 Most pension plans are designed to qualify for favorable tax treatment. The 
regulations provide that a qualified pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan must be a 
“definite written program or arrangement which is communicated to the employees.” Treas. 
Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1976). The definiteness and writing requirements were 
initially promulgated under section 165 of the Revenue Act of 1938 (which was the source 
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when ERISA imposed unalterable federal fiduciary obligations on 
employee benefit plan trustees and plan decision-makers,
20
 and authorized 
plan participants, beneficiaries, and the Secretary of Labor to bring civil 
actions to enforce those fiduciary standards.
21
 Recognizing the instrumental 
value of disclosure, ERISA replaced the WPPDA with a more robust, 
detailed, and exacting information regime. “Federal fiduciary standards 
were designed to work in combination with improved disclosure of plan 
finances and powerful enforcement tools to stem misconduct in plan 
administration.”
22
 The House Committee on Education and Labor 
explained: 
 The underlying theory of the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act to date has been that reporting of generalized 
information concerning plan operations to plan participants and 
beneficiaries and to the public in general would, by subjecting the 
dealings of persons controlling employee benefit plans to the light 
of public scrutiny, insure that the plan would be operated 
according to instructions and in the best interests of participants 
and beneficiaries. The Secretary’s role in this scheme was 
minimal. Disclosure has been seen as a device to impart to 
employees sufficient information and data to enable them to know 
whether the plan was financially sound and being administered as 
intended. It was expected that the information disclosed would 
enable employees to police their plans. But experience has shown 
that the limited data available under the present Act is insufficient. 
Changes are therefore required to increase the information and 
data required in the reports both in scope and detail. Experience 
has also demonstrated a need for a more particularized form of 
reporting so that the individual participant knows exactly where he 
 
of the anti-diversion rule that now appears as I.R.C. § 401(a)(2)), 26 C.F.R. § 9.165-1(a) 
(1939 Supp.), and were apparently intended to ensure that employees would have some 
enforceable rights under state law. Those criteria prevent the employer’s commitment from 
being construed as illusory, a mere gratuity, or unenforceable under the statute of frauds. 
Nevertheless, state trust law standards of loyalty and care can be relaxed by inserting 
exculpatory language in the trust instrument, and employee benefit plans commonly included 
such language prior to ERISA. 
 
20
 ERISA §§ 404(a) (general fiduciary duties), 406 (prohibited transactions), 410(a) 
(“[A]ny provision in an agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary from 
responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation, or duty under this part shall be 
void as against public policy.”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a) 1106, 1110(a) (2012). 
 
21
 ERISA §§ 502(a)(2), 409, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109 (2012). 
 
22
 PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 16 (2010). 
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stands with respect to the plan — what benefits he may be entitled 
to, what circumstances may preclude him from obtaining benefits, 
what procedures he must follow to obtain benefits, and who are the 
persons to whom the management and investment of his plan 
funds have been entrusted. At the same time, the safeguarding 
effect of the fiduciary responsibility section will operate efficiently 
only if fiduciaries are aware that the details of their dealings will 
be open to inspection, and that individual participants and 
beneficiaries will be armed with enough information to enforce 
their own rights as well as the obligations owed by the fiduciary to 
the plan in general.
23
 
Concerning plan finances, the annual report required by ERISA must 
include “a statement of the assets and liabilities of the plan aggregated by 
categories and valued at their current value,”and in addition a “schedule of 
all assets held for investment purposes aggregated and identified by issuer, 
borrower, or lessor, or similar party to the transaction (including a notation 
as to whether such party is known to be a party in interest), maturity date, 
rate of interest, collateral, par or maturity value, cost, and current value.”
24
 
The annual report is filed with the Department of Labor and is open to 
public inspection.
25
 
A summary annual report (SAR) must be furnished to plan participants, 
and to beneficiaries receiving benefits under a pension plan, within 210 
days of the close of the plan year (today this distribution is often 
accomplished by electronic means of communication), but the SAR 
presents only the most general financial information.
26
 With respect to 
assets, the SAR reports only the total net asset value of the plan as of the 
 
 
23
 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 2 STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON 
LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 2358 (Comm. 
Print 1976) [hereinafter ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. See S. REP. NO. 93-127 at 4 (1973) 
(“Experience. . .has demonstrated the inadequacy of the [WPPDA] in. . .protecting rights and 
benefits due to workers. It is weak in its limited disclosure requirements and wholly lacking 
in substantive fiduciary standards.”), reprinted in 1 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 587, 590; 
2 id. at 3293, 3295 (informal report on substitute version of H.R. 2, to same effect). 
 
24
 ERISA § 103(b)(3)(A), (C), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(A), (C) (2012). 
 
25
 ERISA §§ 101(b)(1) (filing), 104(a)(1) (filing deadline and public inspection), 106 
(public inspection), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(b)(1), 1024(a)(1), 1026 (2012). 
 
26
 ERISA §§ 101(a)(2), 104(b)(3), 103(b)(3)(A), (B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(2), 
1024(b)(3), 1023(b)(3)(A), (B) (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 104b-10(d) (prescribed form for 
summary annual report), 104b-1(c) (disclosure via electronic media) (2012). 
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beginning and end of the plan year.
27
 Upon request, participants are entitled 
to receive without charge a copy of “a statement of the assets and liabilities 
of the plan and accompanying notes, or a statement of income and expenses 
of the plan and accompanying notes, or both.”
28
 This statement of assets 
and liabilities refers to the broad categorical overview of the plan’s 
financial position (the generic balance sheet data reported on the plan’s 
Form 5500, Schedule H); it does not include the detailed schedule of all 
investment holdings. The plan administrator must make copies of the latest 
annual report available for examination by plan participants and 
beneficiaries, and they are entitled to be furnished with a copy of the full 
annual report (or any portion thereof) upon making a written request and 
paying a reasonable charge to cover the cost of copying.
29
 Only by making 
such a request and payment can a plan participant obtain a copy of the 
itemized schedule of plan investments, or information concerning indirect 
investment vehicles in which the plan holds an interest.
30
 
B.  Data Sources and Limitations 
The Department of Labor is authorized to prescribe forms for filing 
financial information required in the annual report and to use the data for 
statistical and research purposes, compiling and publishing “such studies, 
analyses, reports, and surveys based thereon as [the Secretary of Labor] 
may deem appropriate.”
31
 Form 5500, the “Annual Return/Report of 
Employee Benefit Plan,” is the vehicle prescribed (in conjunction with the 
Treasury Department) for satisfying ERISA’s annual report obligation.
32
 
Pension plans and funded welfare plans covering 100 or more participants 
are obliged to file the financial information called for by Schedule H.
33
 Part 
 
 
27
 29 C.F.R. § 104b-10(d)(3) (2012). 
 
28
 Id. (penultimate paragraph). 
 
29
 ERISA § 104(b)(2), (4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2), (4) (2012). 
 
30
 See 29 C.F.R. § 104b-10(d)(3) (2012), which requires that the SAR include notice of 
the participant’s right to additional information, including the schedule of “assets held for 
investment” and “information concerning any common or collective trusts, pooled separate 
accounts, master trusts or 103-12 investment entities in which the plan participates” (items 3 
and 9 on the list of available annual report information). 
 
31
 ERISA §§ 109(a) (forms), 106(a) (study quote), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1029(a), 1026(a) 
(2012). 
 
32
 ERISA § 109(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1 (2012) 
(prescribed form and required schedules). See ERISA §§ 104(e), 3004(a) (coordination of 
Labor and Treasury Department rules, practices and forms), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(e), 1204(a) 
(2012). 
 
33
 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-1(b), 2520.104-44(b)(1) (2012) (exemptions for welfare 
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I of Schedule H contains basic balance sheet information, reporting 
beginning-of-year and end-of-year values of assets and liabilities 
aggregated into broad categories, including in the case of assets: non-
interest bearing cash, receivables (categorized as employer contributions, 
employee contributions, and other), interest bearing cash, U.S. government 
securities, corporate debt instruments (other than employer securities) 
classified into preferred and other debt, corporate stock (other than 
employer securities) classified into preferred and common, partnership or 
joint venture interests, real estate (other than employer real property), loans 
(other than to participants), participant loans, interests held in various 
specified indirect investment entities, employer securities, and buildings 
and other property used in plan operations. Part II reports income and 
expense information, again aggregated into broad categories, including 
unrealized appreciation or diminution in value of real estate and “other” 
assets (including government securities, corporate debt, and stocks), and the 
net investment gain or loss attributable to interests held in various specified 
indirect investment entities. The Department of Labor annually compiles 
the categorical balance sheet and income statement data that large pension 
plans report on Schedule H, Parts I and II, and publishes the results, 
subdivided into the amounts attributable to defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans, in a series entitled, “Private Pension Plan Bulletin: 
Abstract of Form 5500 Annual Reports.”
34
 This is the published source of 
asset allocation data on which Figures 1 and 2 are based. 
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that various indirect investment vehicles, 
including master trusts and mutual funds, comprise a very large share of 
overall pension plan investments. Yet such indirect investment vehicles are 
like black boxes that hide their contents — the underlying investment 
holdings of such entities, whether comprised of corporate stocks, bonds, 
real estate, or other assets, are practically invisible. Consequently, even the 
broad categorical breakdown of pension plan assets is potentially 
misleading, because the reported value of direct investments in corporate 
common stock (for example) could be significantly augmented through 
 
plans under which benefits are paid solely from the general assets of the employer or union 
maintaining the plan (unfunded plans), welfare plans which provide benefits solely through 
insurance or a qualified health maintenance organization (insured plans), and welfare plans 
under which benefits are paid in part from the employer’s general assets and partly through 
insurance (partly unfunded and partly insured plans)). Certain fully-insured pension plans are 
also exempt. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-44(b)(2). 
 
34
 E.g., EBSA, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2010 FORM 5500 
ANNUAL REPORTS 23-36 tbls.C4-C11 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/ 
2010pensionplanbulletin.pdf. 
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indirect ownership of common stocks held by opaque investment 
intermediaries. 
Each master trust investment account, or MTIA (defined below), is 
required to file its own Form 5500 annual report, including a Schedule H 
reporting the assets, liabilities, income, gains and losses of the MTIA. 
Correspondingly, an employee benefit plan that invests in the MTIA is 
granted a simplified method of reporting: instead of including the plan’s 
proportionate share of each underlying asset (and liability) of the MTIA 
along with the plan’s direct investments in the appropriate categories (e.g., 
U.S. government securities, corporate debt instruments, common and 
preferred stock) of the plan’s Schedule H balance sheet, the plan reports the 
beginning and end-of-year values of its interests in all MTIAs as a separate 
asset category,
35
 and files a Schedule D on which the plan identifies each 
MTIA in which it invests along with the year-end dollar value of its interest 
in each such MTIA.
36
 The Schedule D information is intended to allow the 
attribution of indirect asset holdings (reported on the MTIA’s Schedule H) 
to the investor-plans that are the ultimate owners. 
Certain other indirect investment vehicles are permitted (but unlike 
MTIAs, are not required) to file their own Form 5500 annual report and 
accompanying schedules. These include common or collective trusts 
managed by a bank or trust company, insurance company pooled separate 
accounts, and investment entities that hold assets of two or more plans that 
are not members of a related group of employee benefit plans. Such 
collective investment vehicles that file their own Form 5500 annual reports 
are, together with MTIAs, referred to as “direct filing entities” (DFEs). An 
employee benefit plan that invests in one or more DFEs reports on Schedule 
H the total current value of its interests in all DFEs of each type, and 
identifies separately on Schedule D each DFE in which it participated at any 
time during the plan year together with the year-end value of the plan’s 
interest. If an insurance company pooled separate account (for example) 
does not file its own Form 5500, then it is not classified as a DFE. A plan 
that invests in such a non-DFE pooled separate account must include the 
current value of its allocable portion of the underlying assets and liabilities 
 
 
35
 E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. & PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORP., FORM 5500, SCHEDULE H, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, Line 1(c)(11) (2008), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-Schedule-H-mp.pdf [hereinafter SCHEDULE H]. 
 
36
 E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., FORM 5500, 
SCHEDULE D, DFE/PARTICIPATING PLAN INFORMATION, Part I (2008), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-Schedule-D-mp.pdf. The MTIA also files a 
schedule D, on which it identifies (Part II) each employee benefit plan that invests in the 
MTIA. 
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of the pooled separate account in the proper categories of the plan’s 
Schedule H, where those amounts will be combined with any assets (or 
liabilities) directly owned (or owed) by the plan that fall in those categories. 
In principle, the Schedule D information allows proper attribution of 
indirect asset holdings (reported on the DFE’s Schedule H) to the investor-
plans that are the ultimate owners of those assets, and that attribution would 
provide a picture of overall portfolio composition of employee benefit plans 
that invest through DFEs. In practice, linking the data poses serious 
challenges, and to date such matching has not been comprehensively 
accomplished. In 2008, 10,512 large (meaning plans covering 100 or more 
participants) defined benefit pension plans filed annual reports, as did 
another 70,029 large defined contribution pension plans.
37
 For that same 
year (2008) there were 7352 Forms 5500 filed by DFEs.
38
 Clearly, 
comprehensive attribution of indirect investments held in DFEs to their 
pension plan owners requires automated data processing. 
Automated data processing, of course, requires data to be available in 
electronic form. Historically, annual reports under ERISA (and its WPPDA 
predecessor) were submitted on paper forms. Beginning in 1999, the 
Department of Labor instituted a system requiring the information 
 
 
37
 See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Rachael K. Hinkle & Andrew D. Martin, Research 
Protocol, Pension Investment Project, n.10 (April, 2013), http://invisiblepensioninvestments. 
wustl.edu/ [hereinafter Research Protocol]. 
 
38
 This total consists of 1652 filings by master trust investment accounts (MTIAs); 
3115 common or collective trust funds (CCTs); 2048 insurance company pooled separate 
accounts (PSAs); and 432 103-12 investment entities (103-12 IEs). Each of those four types 
of DFEs can be utilized by pension plans. (Differences between them are explained below. 
See infra notes 61–84 and accompanying text.) Another 105 filings were by group insurance 
arrangements (GIAs), a type of DFE employed by some insured welfare plans which is not 
relevant to a study of pension fund investments. There were seventy-three duplicate DFE 
filings (amended returns) in 2008, leaving a total of 7174 DFEs that were either MTIA, 
CCT, PSA, or 103-12 IE. Research Protocol, supra note 37, at nn.4, 5. Some of these returns 
reported zero year-end DFE assets. Others failed to include the Schedule H report of assets 
and liabilities, making it impossible in those instances to attribute DFE investments to 
participating plans. 
  The Department of Labor’s count is slightly higher, as it reports 7702 total DFEs in 
2008, as follows: 1693 MTIAs; 3448 CCTs; 2128 PSAs; and 433 103–12 IEs. EBSA, supra 
note 4, tbl.1. The explanation for this discrepancy is not clear because this study derived 
DFE counts directly from the raw data posted on the Department of Labor’s web site. The 
raw filings, however, include returns by 2201 entities which were not identified as either a 
plan or a DFE, so perhaps in conducting its study EBSA determined that some of these 
entities are actually DFEs. No edited or revised DFE data have been posted on the 
Department of Labor’s web site, yet it seems that the EBSA numbers are based on a set of 
data that is somewhat different than the posted raw data. 
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contained in Form 5500 and its accompanying schedules to be submitted in 
a format that could be read by optical character recognition technology. 
This initiative, called “EFAST” (for ERISA Filing Acceptance System), 
entailed scanning paper forms, capturing the data, flagging questionable 
data for manual verification and key-from-image correction as necessary, 
and routine random independent quality control audits of data validity.
39
 In 
accordance with ERISA’s public inspection mandate, the data, once 
converted to electronic form and stripped of personally identifiable 
information (such as plan participant social security numbers), was made 
publicly available.
40
 In addition, the data pertaining to private pension plans 
received special attention. Private pension plan filings were scrutinized to 
identify and correct many statistically important logical and arithmetic data 
inconsistencies that remained after completion of EFAST processing. A 
private contractor performed various automated error checking and 
correction operations to improve the accuracy of the pension plan statistics. 
Important for purposes of this study, special attention was given to the 
pension plan features and characteristics codes.
41
 The resulting edited 
pension plan statistics (starting with the year 2000) are posted on the 
Department of Labor web site under the heading, “Form 5500 Private 
Pension Plan Research Files,” together with a “User Guide” for each year 
that details the editorial operations performed and explains the structure of 
the Research File data set.
42
 
Since January 1, 2010, all Form 5500 returns, required schedules, and 
attachments must be filed electronically using the new EFAST2 system.
43
 
 
 
39
 See EBSA, Privacy Impact Assessment: Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) Filing Acceptance System (EFAST) 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol. 
gov/oasam/ocio/programs/PIA/EBSA/EBSA-EFAST.htm (last visited April 12, 2013). 
 
40
 The raw, unedited data from all of the Form 5500 and Form 5500-SF (the short form 
for small plans that meet certain requirements, see 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1(c)(2) (2012)) 
filings for each year, including the data reported in the various schedules, are posted on the 
Department of Labor’s web site under the heading, “Form 5500 Data Sets.” The raw data 
include all filings by both pension and welfare plans, whether large (100 or more 
participants) or small, and also include DFE filings. Consequently, the raw data contain 
records relating to approximately 800,000 filers. See EBSA, Form 5500 Data Sets, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/foia/foia-5500.html (last visited April 12, 2013). 
 
41
 E.g., Actuarial Research Corporation, User Guide: 2008 Form 5500 Private Pension 
Plan Research File (Contract DOLJ089327412) U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 9 (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-researchfileuserguide.pdf. 
 
42
 EBSA, Pension and Health Plan Bulletins and Form 5550 Data, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/form5500dataresearch.html (last visited Mar. 
3, 2013). 
 
43
 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104a-2(a) (2012) provides: 
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Thus, an all-electronic system that should reduce errors as well as delays 
and costs of data conversion and processing is now in place for all plan 
years beginning on or after January 1, 2009. Nearly all filings submitted 
through EFAST2, including schedules and attachments, are available to the 
general public through the Department of Labor web site, generally within 
one day of transmittal.
44
 
The primary focus of this study is on large private pension plan annual 
returns filed for reporting year 2008, the final year of the period in which 
the part-paper, part-electronic, EFAST filing system was used. Forms 5500 
and accompanying schedules were substantially revised in 2000 to facilitate 
the EFAST filing system, and those changes were motivated in large part by 
the inability to effectively monitor DFE investments under the prior 
reporting system. 
[C]ontinuation of the current rules would result in inadequate 
reporting to the Department [of Labor], would mean that the 
Department would continue to be unable to correlate and 
effectively use the data regarding the more than $2 trillion in plan 
assets invested by plans in DFEs or entities eligible to file as 
DFEs, and, therefore, in the Department’s view, would be adverse 
to the interests of participants and beneficiaries in the aggregate.
45
 
 
Any annual report (including any accompanying statements or schedules) 
filed with the Secretary under part 1 of title I of the Act for any plan year 
(reporting year, in the case of common or collective trusts, pooled 
separate accounts, and similar non-plan entities) beginning on or after 
January 1, 2009, shall be filed electronically in accordance with the 
instructions applicable to such report, and such other guidance as the 
Secretary may provide. 
The ERISA annual reporting and disclosure regulations were revised to mandate electronic 
filing under EFAST2 in late 2007. Annual Reporting and Disclosure, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,710 
(Nov. 16, 2007). For an explanation of the proposed rules, see Annual Reporting and 
Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,392 (proposed July 21, 2006). The corresponding revisions to 
Forms 5500 and attachments, and changes to the accompanying instructions, are set forth in 
Revision of Annual Information Return/Reports, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,731 (Nov. 16, 2007). 
 
44
 EBSA, Frequently Asked Questions: EFAST2 Electronic Filing System, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, Q&A-42, -43, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-EFAST2.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2013). 
 
45
 Annual Reporting and Disclosure Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 21,068, 21,074 (Apr. 
19, 2000). See id. at 21,069 (absence of standardized reporting format for common or 
collective trusts and pooled separate accounts “has made it virtually impossible for the 
Department to correlate and effectively use the data regarding plan assets held for 
investment by CCTs and PSAs” while the value of plans assets invested in such entities had 
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It should be emphasized at the outset that this matching of direct and 
indirect investments can yield only a very rough and incomplete picture of 
large private pension plan investments, considered either singly or in the 
aggregate. The source data for both pension plans and DFEs come from 
Form 5500 Schedule H, which, as explained earlier, reports aggregate 
holdings in specified broad categories of investments (such as U.S. 
government securities, corporate bonds, preferred stock, common stock, 
real estate, etc.).
46
 Plan holdings of common stock, for example, could be 
broadly diversified (along the lines of an equity index fund) or concentrated 
in one or a few sectors or industries.
47
 The stocks could represent 
ownership stakes in either domestic companies or foreign enterprises. 
Similarly, the real estate category offers no breakdown between improved 
and unimproved realty, much less does it give any clue to property location 
or relevant markets. So, while this study fills gaps in our knowledge of the 
allocation of pension plan investments among broad categories of asset 
types, it has little to say about the risk and return characteristics of pension 
plan investment portfolios. As noted earlier, a large pension plan is required 
to file an itemized schedule of its investment assets with its annual report,
48
 
but that detailed specification of individual investment holdings was not, 
during the period of the EFAST filing system, submitted in a format that 
would support routine electronic data capture.
49
 Unfortunately, that 
limitation continues to this day even under the all-electronic EFAST2 filing 
system.
50
 
 
grown from $113.9 billion to $280 billion between 1990 and 1996). 
 
46
 See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
 
47
 ERISA generally requires diversification of plan investments “so as to minimize the 
risk of large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so.” ERISA 
§ 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2012). Many defined contribution plans are 
excused from that requirement, however. ERISA §§ 404(a)(2), 407(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1104(a)(2), 1107(d)(3) (2012). 
 
48
 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 
49
 Form 5500 Schedule H, line 4(i) asks whether the plan had assets held for 
investment during the plan year, and if the answer is yes, a detailed schedule is called for. 
“The schedules must use the format set forth below or a similar format and the same size 
paper as the Form 5500.” 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 35. No standardized 
presentation format is prescribed (a “similar format” is expressly permitted), the size of the 
columns is not specified, and some of the descriptive information is quite variable 
(“Description of investment including maturity date, rate of interest, collateral, par, or 
maturity value”). Consequently, automated electronic data capture of the detailed schedule 
of investments is not feasible. 
 
50
 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. & PENSION BENEFIT 
GUARANTY CORP., FORM 5500, INSTRUCTIONS, at 39-40 (2012), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2012-5500inst.pdf. “Any information that cannot be contained 
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The remaining sections of this part provide additional context that will 
aid in understanding the results of this study. First, the types of indirect 
investment vehicles and the consequence of DFE classification are 
explained. Next we present an overview of the extent to which private 
pension plans utilize indirect investment vehicles. Finally, before turning to 
the methodology used to attribute DFE assets to their investor-plans, 
aggregate descriptive statistics concerning DFE investments are presented. 
C.  Types of Indirect Investment Vehicles 
Disclosure of plan finances facilitates monitoring and oversight, as a 
means to the end of promoting proper investment and disposition of plan 
property. ERISA imposes stringent and unalterable federal obligations of 
loyalty and prudence on employee benefit plan fiduciaries, a broad 
functional category that includes any person to the extent that he “exercises 
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [the 
plan’s] assets.”
51
 To bring sunlight to bear on financial management, the 
 
on the 5500 series forms and schedules may be submitted as an unstructured attachment on 
EFAST2” and must be submitted as either a PDF file or an ASCII Text file. EFAST2 Guide 
for Filers & Service Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, § 5.2.2 (ver. 5.2, Apr. 27, 2011),  
http://www.efast.dol.gov/ 
fip/pubs/EFAST2_Guide_Filers_Service_Providers.pdf. Such “unstructured attachments” 
include the schedule of assets held for investment. See EBSA, supra note 44, Q&A-24a. The 
serious policy implications of this limitation are discussed in Part V, infra, text 
accompanying notes 169-180. 
 
51
 ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2012). Uniform federal fiduciary 
obligations, including both general standards of conduct (derived from the traditional trustee 
duties of loyalty and care), and a set of objectively-defined prohibited transactions, were a 
central policy innovation. 
  ERISA imposes uniform federal fiduciary obligations to control 
mismanagement and abuse of employee benefit programs. While drawing on 
general principles of trust law, ERISA’s fiduciary standards include two 
fundamental departures from prevailing state law. First, the statutory definition of 
fiduciary extends far beyond state law trustees, imposing standards of 
competence and fair dealing on anyone who has or exercises any discretionary 
authority in the administration of the plan or the management of its assets, and on 
investment advisors as well. Second, ERISA voids any attempt to relax its 
stringent fiduciary obligations through the inclusion of exculpatory clauses in the 
plan, even though such indulgences are common and effective under state law. 
  Federal fiduciary standards were designed to work in combination with 
improved disclosure of plan finances and powerful enforcement tools to stem 
misconduct in plan administration. Particularized reporting of transactions 
between the plan and certain related parties would give participants and the 
Department of Labor information needed to assert workers’ rights, while the 
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annual report must include “a statement of the assets and liabilities of the 
plan aggregated by categories and valued at their current value, and the 
same data displayed in comparative form for the end of the previous fiscal 
year of the plan.”
52
 Hence both fiduciary duties and disclosure obligations 
are keyed to the existence and extent of “plan assets.” Until 2006, however, 
the statute left this key category undefined, leaving it to the Department of 
Labor to fill in the meaning of the term by rule.
53
 
The regulatory definition of plan assets, which applies for purposes of 
both ERISA’s information forcing and fiduciary obligation provisions, sets 
out the general rule: 
Generally, when a plan invests in another entity, the plan’s assets 
include its investment, but do not, solely by reason of such 
investment, include any of the underlying assets of the entity. 
However, in the case of a plan’s investment in an equity interest of 
an entity that is neither a publicly-offered security nor a security 
issued by an investment company registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 its assets include both the equity interest 
and an undivided interest in each of the underlying assets of the 
entity, unless it is established that— 
 (i)  The entity is an operating company, or 
 (ii)  Equity participation in the entity by benefit plan investors is 
not significant. 
Therefore, any person who exercises authority or control 
respecting the management or disposition of such underlying 
assets, and any person who provides investment advice with 
 
federal courts, armed with broad remedial powers and supported by nationwide 
service of process, would grant effective relief. Moreover, employees would be 
free to assert their rights without fear of employer retaliation by discharge, 
demotion, or other adverse employment action. 
WIEDENBECK, supra note 22, at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
 
52
 ERISA § 103(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 
53
 The Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 611(f), 120 Stat. 780, 
972, added a definition of plan assets as ERISA § 3(42), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42) (2012), which 
essentially reinforces the prior regulatory definition, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101 (2012). The 
principal departure of the new statutory definition from the longstanding Department of 
Labor rule imposes a limitation on the definition of “benefit plan investor” for purposes of 
determining significant equity ownership under the twenty-five percent test described below. 
See infra note 57 and accompanying text. The 1986 plan asset regulation counted equity 
ownership by all pension or welfare plans, including government plans and church plans that 
are not subject to ERISA, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f)(2)(i) (2012); the new statutory 
definition adopts the twenty-five percent threshold but forbids counting government or 
church plan investments, ERISA § 3(42), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(42) (2012). 
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respect to such assets for a fee (direct or indirect), is a fiduciary of 
the investing plan.
54
 
This standard creates the prospect that the managers of an independent 
entity could, if employee benefit plans own a sufficient equity stake in the 
entity, be held accountable under ERISA for failure to operate the entity 
“solely in the interest of the [investor-plans’] participants and 
beneficiaries”. This derivative or look-through fiduciary status might at first 
seem startling, but consideration of the limits of the rule shows that it was 
designed to prevent evasion of ERISA’s oversight of fiduciary conduct 
through the use of financial intermediaries. 
The look-through rule does not apply to an equity interest that is a 
publicly-offered security or is issued by a registered investment company 
(e.g., mutual fund shares), regardless of the extent of an employee benefit 
plan’s proportionate ownership of the entity. In such cases the periodic 
disclosure obligations imposed by federal securities laws with respect to the 
finances and operations of the entity provide a benchmark against which the 
propriety of the plan’s equity ownership of the entity can be assessed.
55
 
Where federal securities laws do not apply to a plan’s ownership interest in 
another entity, the look-through rule is triggered only if the entity is not an 
“operating company” and benefit plan investors own a “significant” share 
of its equity. An “operating company” is defined as “an entity that is 
primarily engaged, directly or through a majority owned subsidiary or 
subsidiaries, in the production or sale of a product or service other than the 
investment of capital.”
56
 Significant equity participation means that benefit 
 
 
54
 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2) (2012). The Department of Labor’s definition of plan 
assets also applies for purposes of the excise tax on prohibited transactions. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510.3-101(a)(1) (2012); see I.R.C. § 4975. 
 
55
 For the definitions of “equity interest” and “publicly-offered security,” see 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2510.3-101(b) (2012). Moreover, when it comes to mutual funds, the scope of ERISA’s 
fiduciary obligations have always been limited by statute: “In the case of a plan which 
invests in any security issued by an investment company registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, the assets of such plan shall be deemed to include such security but 
shall not, solely by reason of such investment, be deemed to include any assets of such 
investment company.” ERISA § 401(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012). 
 
56
 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Despite the focus on 
financial services, however, the look-through rule does not apply to certain entities that 
predominately make venture capital or real estate investments, but only if the entity qualifies 
as a “venture capital operating company” or “real estate operating company”. Id. Those 
categories are defined with reference to whether the entity has the right to substantially 
participate in the management of the underlying venture capital or real estate investments. 29 
C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(d)(3), (e) (2012). The look-through rule also does not reach the 
underlying assets of certain government-guaranteed mortgage pools. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
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plan investors own twenty-five percent or more of any class of equity 
interest in the entity.
57
 Taken together, these conditions indicate that an 
investment vehicle which may be controlled by one or more employee 
benefit plans offers no escape from ERISA’s unyielding standards of 
fidelity and care, nor from the reporting and disclosure obligations that 
implement those standards. Moreover, the look-through rule applies 
regardless of the form of organization of the investment entity (e.g., trust, 
joint venture, partnership, limited liability company, or corporation). Hence, 
ERISA fixes the scope of financial disclosure with reference to the persons 
who control plan funds and the extent of their control. 
Consistent with the look-through rule, the instructions for completing 
the annual report financial information (Form 5500, Schedule H) state: 
If the assets of two or more plans are maintained in a fund or 
account that is not a DFE [direct filing entity], a registered 
investment company, or the general account of an insurance 
company under an unallocated contract . . ., complete Parts I and II 
[balance sheet and income statement] of the Schedule H by 
entering the plan’s allocable part of each line item.
58
 
In contrast, a plan that utilizes an indirect investment vehicle that qualifies 
as a DFE may simply report the value of the plan’s interest in the entity. In 
principle, there is no need to itemize the plan’s allocable share of the DFE’s 
underlying assets because the DFE files its own Form 5500 and 
accompanying financial information.
59
 In practice, however, the indirect 
investments reported by DFEs have not been routinely or comprehensively 
matched with other assets owned directly by a plan that holds an interest in 
the DFE (an investor-plan). 
 
101(i) (2012). A special rule provides that if a related group of employee benefit plans owns 
all of the outstanding equity interests (other than director’s qualifying shares) of an entity, 
then the assets and management of the wholly-owned enterprise are fully subject to ERISA 
even if it is an operating company and is not engaged in rendering financial services. 29 
C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(3), (4) (2012). 
 
57
 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(f) (2012). 
 
58
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 29; accord id. at 30 (warning that a plan’s 
interest in the underlying assets of a common or collective trust or pooled separate account 
that does not file its own Form 5500 “must be allocated and reported in the appropriate 
categories on a line-by-line basis on Part I of the Schedule H”). See also 29 C.F.R. § 
2520.103-10(b)(1)(ii) (2012) (“Except as provided in the Form 5500 and the instructions 
thereto, in the case of assets or investment interests of two or more plans maintained in one 
trust, all entries on the schedule of assets held for investment purposes that relate to the trust 
shall be completed by including the plan’s allocable portion of the trust.”). 
 
59
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 11-14. 
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A pension plan follows simplified financial reporting rules for 
investments in any of four types of DFEs: (1) master trust investment 
accounts; (2) some common or collective trusts maintained by banks or 
trust companies; (3) some insurance company pooled separate accounts; 
and (4) certain investment entities that hold plan assets (under the look-
through rule described above), which may include real estate investment 
funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds. Pension plan sponsors share 
an impetus to consolidate funds for investment purposes, thereby obtaining 
the financial advantages of economies of scale and increased 
diversification, so long as that pooling will not jeopardize the favorable tax 
treatment of their plans.
60
 As explained below, these four DFE varieties are 
 
 
60
 Tax exemption of a qualified trust requires that it form “part of a stock bonus, 
pension, or profit-sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees and 
their beneficiaries,” I.R.C. § 401(a), and the use of the singular (“an employer”) created 
doubt about whether multiple employers could pool qualified plan assets in a combined trust 
without forfeiting favorable tax treatment. At least as early as 1939 the Service announced 
that “[a] trust forming part of a plan of affiliated corporations for their employees may be 
exempt if all requirements are otherwise satisfied.” Regulation 101, Treas. Reg. § 9.165-1(f) 
(issued under the Revenue Act of 1938 and published in the 1939 Supplement to the Code of 
Federal Regulations). That language was carried forward in various iterations of the 
regulations under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 39.165-1(b) (1953) 
(applicable to taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1951); id. § 39.1-1(b). By its terms, 
however, this regulation only blessed a trust created under “a plan” (singular) covering the 
employees of an affiliated group of corporations. Moreover, in determining whether “all 
requirements are otherwise satisfied” the qualification standards were apparently applied to 
each member corporation separately because each is a distinct “employer.” See I.R.C. 
§ 404(a)(3)(B); H.R. REP. NO. 1337, at 43, A150–51 (1954) (member of affiliated group 
lacking current or accumulated earnings and profits cannot make contributions for its 
employees under common profit-sharing plan of the group, and prior to 1954 profitable 
group members could not deduct contributions for loss corporation’s employees); S. REP. 
NO. 83-1622, at 54–55, A150–51 (1954) (same); Rev. Rul. 69-35, 1969-1 C.B. 117. 
By 1944 the Service was permitting unrelated corporations to adopt a single plan and 
contribute to a common exempt trust, but the qualification requirements of Code section 
401(a) and the limits on deductible contributions of section 404(a) were applicable to each 
participating employer separately. P.S. No. 14 (Aug. 24, 1944), reprinted in GERHARD A. 
MUNCH, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INSURED PENSIONS, app. 4, at App-103 (1966), restated and 
superseded by Rev. Rul. 69-230, 1969-1 C.B. 116; see Rev. Rul. 32, § 3, 1953-1 C.B. 265 
(requests for advance rulings may be submitted by industry-wide or other multiple employer 
plans); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(d) (adopted 1956). 
With ERISA’s enactment in 1974, plans adopted by unaffiliated companies became 
subject to a few special qualification requirements. A “multiemployer plan” is a plan 
maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement under which two or more unrelated 
employers are required to contribute. ERISA § 3(37), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (2012); I.R.C. 
§ 414(f). Some qualification conditions are relaxed for multiemployer plans, I.R.C. § 413(b), 
as are the advance funding and PBGC termination insurance rules for DB plans. ERISA 
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common mechanisms to consolidate funds for investment. 
A master trust pools assets of two or more plans sponsored by a single 
employer or by a group of commonly controlled employers, with a bank, 
trust company, or similar regulated financial institution that is subject to 
periodic examination by a federal or state agency serving as trustee.
61
 (The 
regulated financial institution that serves as trustee may exercise 
discretionary authority over asset management in accordance with the terms 
of the master trust agreement, or it could instead function as a so-called 
“directed trustee” carrying out the instructions of the plan’s named 
fiduciary.
62
) This definition of “master trust,” it should be noted, only 
applies “[f]or purposes of annual reporting” — the term master trust lacks a 
single fixed meaning. (In other contexts it describes different types of 
collective investment devices, including trusts combining assets 
accumulated under plans of unrelated employers.
63
) Typically, a master 
 
§§ 302(a), 304, 4201–4303, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a), 1084, 1381–1453 (2012); I.R.C. 
§§ 412(a), 431–32. Where two or more unrelated employers maintain a single plan that is 
not the product of collective bargaining, the program is now generally called a “multiple 
employer plan.” Mere adoption by distinct employers of a plan having identical terms does 
not make the program a single plan; a single plan exists if and only if all assets are available 
to provide benefits to a covered employee of either employer. See I.R.C. § 413(c), Treas. 
Reg. §§ 1.413-2, 1.413-1(a)(2), 1.414(l)-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1979); see generally 1 
MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS §§ 6:2, 6:11, 6:13 (2012–2013 ed.) 
(distinguishing collectively bargained plans, multiemployer plans and multiple employer 
plans). Hence a form plan adopted by several employers ordinarily is not a multiple 
employer plan; despite uniform terms the arrangement gives rise to independent single 
employer plans sponsored by each adopting company. Similarly, the Department of Labor 
takes the position that for purposes of ERISA Title I, including reporting and disclosure rules 
and fiduciary obligations, a plan and trust adopted by several unrelated employers is not a 
single multiple employer plan if the adopting employers are not members of a bona fide 
group or association of employers. ERISA Op. Ltr. 2012-04A (May 25, 2012); see generally 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-665, PRIVATE SECTOR PENSIONS: FEDERAL 
AGENCIES SHOULD COLLECT DATA AND COORDINATE OVERSIGHT OF MULTIPLE EMPLOYER 
PLANS (2012). See infra notes 63, 69 (concerning master plans and associated trusts). 
 
61
 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1(e) (2012). 
 
62
 Id. (parenthetical clause); see ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2012) 
(permission for directed trustees). 
 
63
 For example, the master trust moniker is commonly applied to a collective trust 
established under a master plan. Master plan means a form plan which “is made available by 
a sponsor for adoption by employers and for which a single funding medium (for example, a 
trust or custodial account) is established, as part of the plan, for the joint use of all adopting 
employers” and which complies with Service procedures for obtaining an advance 
determination as to its qualification. Rev. Proc. 2011-49, § 4.01, 2011-44 I.R.B. 608, 611. 
Typically, master plans are developed by trade associations, professional organizations, 
banks, insurance companies, or regulated investment companies, and the sponsor offers the 
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trust is composed of several distinct asset pools, the beneficial ownership of 
which is shared in varying proportions by the plans that participate in the 
master trust, and each such subsidiary “master trust investment account” 
(MTIA), rather than the encompassing master trust itself, is a DFE. 
 The assets of a master trust are considered for reporting 
purposes to be held in one or more ‘‘investment accounts.’’ A 
‘‘master trust investment account’’ may consist of a pool of assets 
or a single asset. Each pool of assets held in a master trust must be 
treated as a separate MTIA if each plan that has an interest in the 
pool has the same fractional interest in each asset in the pool as its 
fractional interest in the pool, and if each such plan may not 
dispose of its interest in any asset in the pool without disposing of 
its interest in the pool. A master trust may also contain assets that 
are not held in such a pool. Each such asset must be treated as a 
separate MTIA.
64
 
Accordingly, although several plans of one employer or of one group of 
commonly controlled employers can employ a single master trust 
administered by a particular bank as trustee, if the trust maintains multiple 
accounts (representing distinct underlying asset pools), and there is any 
 
master plan as a low-cost preapproved plan that may be utilized by its members or 
customers. As the employers adopting a master plan are unrelated, a master trust that serves 
as the collective funding medium for the participating employers is not a “master trust” 
within the meaning of the Department of Labor’s annual report regulations. See Rev. Rul. 
71-461, 1971-2 C.B. 227 (where several employers adopted master plan but coverage under 
one adopting employer’s plan became discriminatory, exempt status of master trust not 
adversely affected if the trustee transfers the funds held under the disqualified plan to an 
unrelated trust as soon as administratively feasible). Instead, a trust funding vehicle for a 
master plan is ordinarily classified as a common or collective trust for annual reporting 
purposes. See infra note 69. 
Master plan procedures were first developed to handle the flood of determination letter 
requests by small employers following the 1963 extension of qualified status to plans 
covering self-employed individuals (so-called “Keogh” or “H.R. 10” plans covering partners 
and sole proprietors). Rev. Proc. 63-23, § 3.02, 1963-2 C.B. 757. The program was so 
successful that the Service later extended it to corporate plans, Rev. Proc. 68-45, § 2, 1968-2 
C.B. 957, 958, and it has been repeatedly expanded, refined, and updated ever since, Rev. 
Proc. 2011-49, supra. Indeed, a random survey of 1200 sponsors conducted in 2010 found 
that 86% of 401(k) plans are some form of pre-approved plan (such as a master, prototype, 
or volume submitter plan); only 14% were individually-designed plans. EMP. PLANS 
COMPLIANCE UNIT, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SECTION 401(K) COMPLIANCE CHECK 
QUESTIONNAIRE INTERIM REPORT 56–57 (2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/401k_interim_report.pdf. 
 
64
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 11. 
WIEDENBECK07013 6/30/2013  9:29 PM 
2013] Invisible Pension Investments 617 
 
variation in the proportionate beneficial interests of the investor-plans 
between those accounts, then a separate Form 5500 must be filed for each 
such MTIA. 
In contrast to a master trust, participation in which is (for purposes of 
annual reporting
65
) restricted to plans maintained by commonly controlled 
businesses, a common or collective trust (CCT) is a fund maintained by a 
bank, trust company, or similar regulated financial institution for the 
collective investment of funds contributed by unrelated participants, which 
may be employee benefit plans or other persons. A CCT may hold funds 
from plans maintained by unrelated employers,
66
 and it may also contain 
other funds held by the financial institution in a fiduciary capacity, whether 
as trustee, executor, guardian, or custodian under state laws that correspond 
to the Uniform Gift to Minors Act (UGMA).
67
 For tax reasons, a CCT 
ordinarily constitutes either a common trust fund or a type of collective trust 
sometimes called a group trust. 
A common trust fund receives special treatment under the Internal 
Revenue Code: it is not subject to tax as an entity (as either a corporation or 
a complex trust) but instead reports to its participants their proportionate 
shares of the fund’s ordinary income (loss), short and long-term capital 
gains (losses), and qualified dividend income for the calendar year, whether 
or not distributed or distributable.
68
 Participating qualified plans, of course, 
do not pay tax on their shares of the common trust fund’s income, but the 
pass-through of the tax results of operations is important to taxable 
participants, which may include estates of decedents or incapacitated 
individuals, private trusts, and minors receiving property under the UGMA. 
A group trust pools the assets of several qualified pension or profit-
sharing plans, including plans with different terms maintained by unrelated 
employers. If certain conditions are satisfied, including adoption of the 
group trust as part of each participating retiree benefit plan and express 
language in both the group trust instrument and each participating plan 
 
 
65
 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 
66
 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-3(a), (b) (2012). 
 
67
 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (2012) (authority for national banks to establish collective 
investment funds for assets held in a fiduciary capacity, referring separately to common trust 
funds in (a)(1) and group trusts in (a)(2)). 
 
68
 I.R.C. §§ 584 (common trust fund), 581 (definition of bank). Participants in the 
common trust fund include these amounts on their own returns in combination with similar 
items of income or loss derived from other sources. Thus, a common trust fund receives a 
simplified version of conduit or pass-through tax treatment, akin to that accorded regulated 
investment companies (mutual funds) under I.R.C. § 852. I.R.C. § 584 originated as section 
169 of the Revenue Act of 1936, in response to court decisions that held such commingled 
investment funds taxable as corporations. S. REP. NO. 74-2156, at 20 (1936). 
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barring diversion of assets attributable to one participating plan to 
employees or beneficiaries under another participating plan, then the 
participating trusts retain their tax-exempt status and the group trust also 
constitutes a qualified trust.
69
 The exemption for such group trusts 
originated in 1956,
70
 but has been continued and expanded over the years, 
so that participants may now include, in addition to qualified pension, 
profit-sharing and stock bonus plans, individual retirement accounts, 
eligible governmental deferred compensation plans under I.R.C. § 457(b), 
custodial accounts and retirement income accounts under § 403(b) tax-
sheltered annuity plans, and governmental plans specified in § 401(a)(24).
71
 
CCTs (both common trust funds and group trusts) may also qualify for 
certain exemptions under the federal securities laws.
72
 The authorization for 
 
 
69
 Rev. Rul. 2011-1, 2011-2 I.R.B. 256. The “master trust” funding medium under a 
preapproved master plan (see supra note 63) would ordinarily qualify as a group trust and 
therefore be classified as a CCT for annual reporting purposes. Such a “master trust” is not 
an MTIA for reporting purposes because it pools funds accumulated under multiple plans 
(albeit plans that share common terms) of unrelated employers. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.413-
2(a)(2) (“mere fact that a plan, or plans, utilizes a common trust fund or otherwise pools plan 
assets for investment purposes does not, by itself, result in a particular plan being treated as” 
a multiple employer plan subject to § 413(c); master or prototype plan maintained by 
employers that are not members of commonly controlled group is subject to § 413(c) only if 
it is a single plan), 1.413-1(a)(2), 1.414(l)-1(b)(1) (single plan requires that all plan assets be 
available to pay benefits to employees covered the plan) (as amended in 1979), Rev. Rul. 
2011-1, supra (terms of a group trust required to provide that assets contributed under one 
participating plan may not be used to benefit employees or beneficiaries under another 
participating plan). 
 
70
 The Federal Reserve Board amended its regulations specifying trust powers of 
national banks in 1955 to permit collective investment of the funds of two or more qualified 
pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans. 20 Fed. Reg. 3305 (May 14, 1955) (amending 
12 C.F.R. § 206.10(c) (1955)); see 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (2012) (current version). Shortly 
thereafter the Service ruled that if participation in such a “group trust” is limited to trusts 
under qualified pension or profit-sharing plans and specified protections were in place, then 
the group trust would constitute a qualified trust. Rev. Rul. 56-267, 1956-1 C.B. 206; see 
also Rev. Proc. 56-12, § 2.02(d), 1956-1 C.B. 1029 (procedure to apply for determination of 
qualified status of “master trust” under a pooled fund arrangement, where “individual trusts 
under separate plans pool[] their funds for investment purposes through a master trust”). 
 
71
 Rev. Rul. 2011-1, 2011-2 I.R.B. 256. But see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,873 (Apr. 
15, 1992) (participation by voluntary employees’ beneficiary association will disqualify the 
group trust). See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 337–38 (1974) (Conf. Rep.) (ERISA 
conference committee directs Service to allow IRAs to participate in group trusts). 
 
72
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2) (registration exemption under the Securities Act of 1933), 
78c(a)(12)(A)(iii), (iv) (common trust fund an exempted security under Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934), 78c(a)(12)(A)(iv) (same for group pension trust), 80a-3(c)(3) (exemption 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, provided that interests in the fund are not 
advertised or offered for sale to the general public), 80a-3(c)(11) (exemption under the 
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national banks to operate collective investment funds is closely coordinated 
with their special treatment under federal tax and securities laws.
73
 
A pooled separate account (PSA) is a collective investment fund like a 
CCT, but one that is managed by a state-regulated insurance company.
74
 
The PSA was developed in the 1960s to allow insurance companies to offer 
an investment vehicle for pension plan assets that would not be subject to 
the stringent investment constraints (particularly limits on holding common 
stock) imposed by state insurance laws and could provide a higher return 
than the insurer’s general asset account.
75
 The insurance company does not 
guarantee preservation of principal or a minimum investment return on 
funds invested in a PSA; plans that participate in the PSA are credited with 
units representing a proportionate share of the assets in the separate account 
and are entitled upon withdrawing funds to a redemption payment that 
reflects the investment return and market value of the account assets. To 
 
Investment Company Act of 1940 for bank-maintained common trust funds consisting solely 
of assets of qualified plans or certain government or church plans) (2012). See generally 1 
TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 
§ 6.06[B] & [C] (2d ed. 2001). 
 
73
 Compare 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(7) (2012) (“A bank may not advertise or publicize any 
fund authorized under paragraph (a)(1) of this section, except in connection with the 
advertisement of the general fiduciary services of the bank.”) with 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3) 
(2012) (exemption under the Investment Company Act of 1940, provided that interests in the 
fund are not advertised or offered for sale to the general public). Indeed, an earlier version of 
the national bank regulation authorizing collective investment of fiduciary funds explained: 
  The purpose of this section is to permit the use of Common Trust Funds, as 
defined in section 584 of the Internal Revenue Code, for the investment of funds 
held for true fiduciary purposes; and the operation of such Common Trust Funds 
as investment trusts for other than strictly fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited. 
No bank administering a common trust fund shall issue any document evidencing 
a direct or indirect interest in such common trust fund in any form which purports 
to be negotiable or assignable. The trust investment committee of a bank 
operating a Common Trust Fund shall not permit any funds of any trust to be 
invested in a Common Trust Fund if it has reason to believe that such trust was 
not created or is not being used for bona fide fiduciary purposes. A bank 
administering a Common Trust Fund shall not, in soliciting business or otherwise, 
publish or make representations which are inconsistent with this paragraph or the 
other provisions of this part and, subject to the applicable requirements of the 
laws of any State, shall not advertise or publicize the earnings realized on any 
Common Trust Fund or the value of the assets thereof. 
12 C.F.R. § 206.17(a)(3) (1959). 
 
74
 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-4(a), (b) (2012). Insurance company separate account assets 
are classified as plan assets under ERISA. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(1)(iii) (2012). 
 
75
 See generally FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 72, § 5.06[A]. 
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offer a competitive pension investment alternative, PSA income must 
escape tax at the insurance company level. Under the special tax regime 
applicable to life insurance companies, gains and losses on assets held in 
the separate account are not taxed.
76
 Similarly, income produced by PSA 
investments (dividends, interest, rents, etc.), to the extent credited to the 
account, is not taxed as income of the insurance company.
77
 PSAs may also 
qualify for certain exemptions under the federal securities laws.
78
 A PSA 
may hold funds from plans maintained by unrelated employers, but to 
qualify for the securities law exemptions participation must be limited to 
qualified pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plans, and certain governmental 
retirement plans.
79
 Hence, welfare plan involvement would trigger loss of 
the securities law exemptions. Observe that the requirement that all plans 
participating in a master trust must be sponsored by a single employer or 
related group of employers means that an MTIA may invest in a CCT or 
PSA, but not vice versa.
80
 
 
 
76
 I.R.C. §§ 817(b) (basis of assets in variable contract segregated asset account 
increased or decreased by any appreciation or diminution in value), (d), (e) (pension plan 
contracts treated as variable contract), 818(a) (pension plan contract includes contracts with 
qualified pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus and annuity plans, § 403(b) plans, IRAs, 
governmental plans qualified under § 401(a), and eligible deferred compensation plans under 
§457(b)); see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9230023 (Apr. 29, 1992) (PSA qualifies as variable 
contract under § 817(d)). See also I.R.C. § 817(a) (separate account asset appreciation 
excluded from increase in reserves, thereby preventing insurer from claiming deduction 
under § 807(b) for an amount not included in gross income); RICHARD S. ANTES ET AL., 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES § 17.05[3] (2011). 
 
77
 See I.R.C. §§ 801(d)(1), (e)(1)(B), 818(a) (deductible reserves for pension plan 
contract set by reference to balance in the policyholder’s fund). 
 
78
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(2) (registration exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 for 
contract issued by insurance company in connection with qualified pension, profit-sharing, 
stock bonus or annuity plan, as well as certain governmental and church plans), 
78c(a)(12)(A)(iv), (a)(12)(C) (exempted security under Securities Exchange Act of 1934), 
80a-3(c)(11) (exemption under the Investment Company Act of 1940) (2012). FRANKEL & 
SCHWING, supra note 72, §§ 5.06, 6.06[G]. Observe that the exemptions under the 1933 and 
1934 Acts do not apply to contracts issued in connection with a plan covering one or more 
owners of an unincorporated business (a so-called Keogh or H.R. 10 plan). See H.R. REP. 
NO. 91-1382, at 44 (1970) (Keogh plans not exempted “because of their fairly complex 
nature as an equity investment and because of the likelihood that they could be sold to self-
employed persons, unsophisticated in the securities field”). 
 
79
 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(11), -2(a)(37), 77c(a)(2)(C) (2012) (exemption under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 restricted to insurance company separate accounts the 
assets of which are “derived solely from” qualified pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plans, 
or certain governmental plans). 
 
80
 See 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 11 (Form 5500 for MTIA must include 
“Schedule D, to list CCTs, PSAs, and 103-12 IEs in which the MTIA invested at any time 
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Both CCTs and PSAs predate ERISA, and Congress anticipated that 
many employee benefit plans would turn to them for investment services. 
The statute provides that if some or all of the assets of a plan are held in a 
CCT or PSA, then the investor-plan’s annual report “shall include the most 
recent annual statement of assets and liabilities” of the CCT or PSA, but it 
allows the Department of Labor, by regulation, to dispense with plan filing 
“if such statement or other information is filed with the Secretary by the 
bank or insurance carrier which maintains the common or collective trust or 
separate account.”
81
 A CCT or PSA may or may not be a DFE. (This is in 
contrast to an MTIA, which is an obligatory DFE.) If a CCT or PSA files its 
own Form 5500 accompanied by Schedule D, to identify the participating 
plans, and Schedule H, reporting financial information for the CCT and 
PSA, then the investment fund is a DFE and each investor-plan need only 
identify the DFE and report the current value of and net investment gain or 
loss relating to the plan’s interest in the CCT or PSA.
82
 If the CCT or PSA 
does not file as a DFE (and so does not submit Schedules D and H), then an 
investor-plan must report with its financial information (Schedule H for a 
large plan) “the current value of the plan’s allocable portion of the 
underlying assets and liabilities of the [CCT or PSA] and the net investment 
gain or loss relating to the units of participation [held by the plan in the 
CCT or PSA]” along with identifying information relating to the CCT or 
PSA.
83
 
The remaining variety of DFE that may be utilized by pension plans is 
known as a “103-12 Investment Entity” (or 103-12 IE), after the number of 
the Department of Labor regulation that authorizes separate filing. This 
reporting option is available to any investment vehicle other than a CCT or 
PSA, regardless of the entity’s form of organization (joint venture, 
 
during the MTIA year and to list all plans that participated in the MTIA during its year”). 
 
81
 ERISA § 103(b)(3)(G), (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(G), (b)(4) (2012). 
 
82
 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-9 (DFE treatment conditioned upon bank or insurance 
company that maintains the CCT or PSA filing completed Form 5500 and required 
schedules; administrator of investor-plan must also supply the plan number, and the name 
and employer identification number of plan sponsor, to the bank or insurer to enable 
identification of the plan on the return filed for the CCT or PSA (see Schedule D Part II)), 
-3(c)(1) (CCT), -4(c)(1) (PSA) (2012). 
 
83
 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-3(c)(2) (CCT), -4(c)(2) (PSA) (2012); see supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. The sponsoring financial intermediary is required to transmit to the 
administrator of each investor-plan a certified annual statement of assets and liabilities of the 
CCT or PSA and the value of the plan’s units of participation, and must also state whether or 
not the CCT or PSA will file as a DFE. ERISA § 103(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(2) 
(statutory information-forcing authority) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-5(c)(1)(ii), (iii) 
(PSA), -5(c)(2)(i), (ii) (CCT) (2012). 
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partnership, limited liability company, etc.), if the entity holds plan assets of 
two or more plans that are not members of a related group of employee 
benefit plans.
84
 The definition of plan assets provides that significant equity 
ownership of an investment entity by employee benefit plans causes the 
underlying assets of the entity to be classified as plan assets, making any 
person who exercises authority or control respecting the management or 
disposition of such underlying assets a fiduciary of the investor-plans.
85
 
This look-through rule is triggered where aggregate ownership by employee 
benefit plans constitutes twenty-five percent or more of any class of equity 
interests in the entity, but a DFE filing as a 103-12 IE requires two or more 
unrelated plans to be equity owners. If such a look-through investment 
vehicle does not file as a DFE, then an investor-plan must include on its 
annual report financial information relating to the plan’s allocable share of 
the underlying investments and transactions of the entity.
86
 
Each of these four types of DFE (MTIA, CCT, PSA, and 103-12 IE) 
can be utilized by either large (100 or more participants) or small (less than 
100 participants) pension plans. They can each also be used as indirect 
investment vehicles by funded welfare plans. In practice, however, welfare 
plan utilization seems to be quite limited. A DFE is required to identify 
each plan that participates in it at any time during the DFE’s reporting year 
on Part II of Schedule D.
87
 That identification calls for a report of the 
employer identification number (EIN) and plan number (PN) of each 
investor-plan. For each DFE included in our study that had non-zero assets 
at the close of the DFE’s year we tried to match reported investor-plan 
identifiers to a 2008 Form 5500 filing by the investor-plan, and where a 
match was found we recorded whether the investor was a large pension 
plan, small pension plan, welfare plan, another DFE, or an investor of 
unidentified type. From the summary results reported in Table 1 it is readily 
seen that very few welfare plans are identified as investors in any of the 
four DFE types. It is also apparent that DFEs — especially CCTs and PSAs 
— report a very large number of investors on Schedule D, Part II, that could 
not be associated with the EIN and PN of a pension or welfare plan that 
 
 
84
 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-12(c), (e) (2012). For participating plans to obtain the full 
benefit of tax-free accumulation, it is important that the investment entity not be subject to 
the corporate income tax. Consequently, 103-12 IEs are ordinarily organized in a form that 
qualifies for conduit tax treatment as a partnership (or conceivably, as an S corporation). 
I.R.C. §§ 701, 1363(a); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006). 
 
85
 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-12(c) (definition of 103-12 Investment Entity), 2510.3-101 
(plan asset definition) (2012). See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text. 
 
86
 See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-12(a) (2012); supra text accompanying note 58. 
 
87
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 25 (Schedule D Instructions). 
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filed a Form 5500. While the explanation for this phenomenon is not clear, 
it seems likely that some of these unidentified investors are single-
participant plans that are not required to file Form 5500 with the 
Department of Labor, instead filing Form 5500-EZ with the IRS.
88
 
 
 
In addition to DFEs, ERISA allows a plan to invest in a registered 
investment company (including, most commonly, mutual funds), or in the 
general account of an insurance company, without treating the underlying 
assets of the fund or account as plan assets.
89
 As a result, the look-through 
rule does not apply, and the investor-plan is not obligated to report its share 
of the assets, liabilities, or investment results of the mutual fund or 
 
 
88
 Alternatively, the unidentified investors might be plans that were misidentified on 
the DFE’s Schedule D (incorrect EINPN supplied), or they might be plans that failed to file 
Form 5500 in 2008. Indeed, perhaps these mystery investors are not employee benefits plans 
at all — maybe the bank or insurance company might simply list the EIN of all entities that 
invest in the CCT or PSA without regard to whether they are pension or welfare plans. 
For the exemption from filing Form 5500 for one-participant plans, see 2008 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 3. 
 
89
 ERISA § 401(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2012) (mutual fund assets not deemed 
plan assets); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(a)(2), (h)(1) (2012) (look-through rule inapplicable to 
security issued by investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940). Insurance company assets are statutorily exempt from the look-through rule only if 
the plan’s policy or contract with the insurance company provides for benefits the amount of 
which is guaranteed by the insurer. ERISA § 401(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (2012). The 
scope of this guaranteed benefit policy exception was uncertain until the Supreme Court 
gave it an expansive reading in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. 
Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993). The insurance industry reacted with alarm to the decision in 
Harris Trust, seeking protection from ERISA fiduciary obligations. Congress responded by 
providing a safe harbor for policies issued to an employee benefit plan that are supported by 
the assets of the insurer’s general account, but that safe harbor applies only to policies issued 
before 1999. ERISA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(c) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.401c-1 (2012). 
See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101(h)(2) (2012) (look-through rule does not apply to plan’s interest 
in an insurance company, apparently including an equity interest obtained by virtue of being 
a policyholder in a mutual insurance company). 
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insurance company. Moreover, because a mutual fund is subject to regular 
financial disclosure under federal securities laws, while an insurance 
company is subject to state regulation and periodic examination, the mutual 
fund or insurance company is not — unlike investment vehicles that are 
DFEs — obligated to file an annual report under ERISA.
90
 
D.  Pension Plan Utilization of Indirect Investment Vehicles 
To what extent do private pension plans utilize these types of indirect 
investment vehicles? Figure 1 shows the aggregate results for large (100 or 
more participants at the start of the plan year) defined benefit (DB) plans in 
2010, and Figure 2 gives the comparable overview for large defined 
contribution (DC) plans of all types. 
In 2010, almost half (49.4%) of DB plan assets consist of MTIA 
interests, while the second-largest DB asset category consists of interests in 
another type of DFE¸ investments in CCTs (11.7%). Shares of registered 
investment companies (mutual funds) are the fourth-largest asset class 
(7.3%), while large DB plans invested very little through insurance 
companies (1.4% in pooled separate accounts and only 0.6% in general 
accounts), or 103-12 investment entities (1.8%). 
The composite asset allocation picture is quite different for large DC 
pension plans (Figure 2). Here the largest single asset category is mutual 
fund shares (42.1% in 2010), followed in second place by interests in 
MTIAs (20.4%). The third largest asset category consists of CCT interests 
(9.9%), while stakes in PSAs come in sixth (3.5%). Insurance company 
general account assets are significant for large DC plans (4.4%), while 103-
12 investment entities contribute a miniscule fraction of average holdings 
(less than 0.1%). 
A more nuanced picture emerges if private pension plans are 
subdivided into categories based on the size of each plan’s total assets. 
Ranked by asset size, there is tremendous variability in “large plans” 
(meaning 100 or more participants). Figure 3 shows the utilization of six 
indirect investment vehicles by large DB plans in 2008, grouping the plans 
into ten categories (deciles) according to the size of their total assets. There 
are 1053 plans in each decile (because there were 10,532 large DB plans in 
2008 that reported non-zero assets), but average total plan assets in each 
decile increases from only $1.56 million in the lowest decile, to $149 
 
 
90
 Although it does not file Form 5500, an insurance company that provides funds from 
its general account for the payment of benefits is obligated to provide information to the plan 
administrator that is needed to prepare the plan’s annual report and schedules, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 2520.103-5(b)(1), (c)(1)(i) (2012). 
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million in the second-highest category, rocketing to $1.57 billion in the top 
decile. (Note that the dotted line showing mean total assets is plotted 
against a logarithmic scale on the secondary vertical axis.) MTIA shares 
grow rapidly in the highest asset categories (top three deciles); the 
dominance of master trusts is clearly attributable to the investment 
technique of a few hundred plans with huge portfolios. CCT usage grows 
slowly but steadily with plan asset size, roughly doubling (from about 7% 
to 14%) between plans having the smallest and the largest amounts of 
investment assets. Conversely, reliance on mutual funds drops dramatically 
in the upper asset ranges, while use of insurers as financial intermediaries, 
whether through a pooled separate account or via investment in the 
insurance company’s general account, steadily declines in the upper half of 
the asset spectrum. 
Figure 4 presents the corresponding picture for large DC plans (of all 
types) in 2008. There are 7002 plans in each decile (because there were 
70,020 large DC plans in 2008 that reported non-zero assets), and average 
total plan assets in each decile increases from only $320,000 in the lowest 
decile, to $255 million in the top decile. (Again in Figure 4 the dotted line 
showing mean total assets is plotted against a logarithmic scale on the 
secondary vertical axis.) Interestingly, MTIA utilization is insignificant 
except in the very largest DC plans: it jumps from almost nothing to 
twenty-five percent of total assets between the second-highest and the 
highest asset classes (ninth and tenth deciles). While mutual funds 
investments dominate all DC plan asset ranges, their share falls sharply 
(from 53% to 33%) at the very top (between the ninth and tenth deciles). As 
with DB plans, usage of CCTs increases steadily with plan asset size, while 
PSA usage declines over the upper asset ranges. Unlike the DB pattern, 
investments in insurance company general accounts do not appear to be 
inversely related to a DC plan’s total assets. 
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The indirect investment vehicle utilization patterns presented in Figures 
3 and 4 (for DB and DC plans, respectively) exhibit some noteworthy 
relationships that suggest a number of preliminary hypotheses. Beginning 
with the DB data, observe the striking inverse relation between registered 
investment company (mutual fund) and MTIA investments at all asset 
levels. The sum of RIC and MTIA investments remains nearly constant, 
lying between forty-five and fifty percent over all deciles of plan total 
assets, and so the curves are almost mirror image reflections about a 
horizontal line drawn at the twenty-five percent portfolio share. This 
inverse relationship seems to imply that MTIAs and RICs operate as 
functional substitutes for DB plans, with investment through master trusts 
becoming more attractive and mutual funds correspondingly less desirable 
as the size of a plan’s total assets increases. Two explanations for such a 
shift to MTIAs as plan assets increase seem plausible. First, maintaining a 
master trust may entail high fixed costs so that MTIAs provide a lower 
expense ratio (higher net return) than mutual funds only where there is a 
fairly high level of assets under management. Alternatively, mutual funds 
might limit the size of pension plan investments out of concern that the fund 
could suffer liquidity and stability problems should an investor-plan 
demand redemption of a large stake in the fund on short notice.
91
 The DC 
data (Figure 4) show the same dramatic inverse relationship between RIC 
and MTIA investments among high-asset plans (note the sharp 
countervailing bends in the curves between the ninth and tenth deciles). 
Low-asset DB plans make some significant use of insurance companies 
as financial intermediaries — either through a separate account investment 
(PSA) or a guaranteed interest in an insurer’s general account — but 
reliance on insurance steadily declines as the level of plan assets increases. 
Insurance, and in particular PSA investment, is markedly more important to 
DC plans than to DB plans. Also unlike DB plans, DC plan utilization of 
insurers’ general accounts remains fairly steady rather than markedly 
declining with increases in total plan assets. The allocation of a constant 
proportion of the portfolio to general account investments, regardless of DC 
plan asset level, might be explained by the popularity of guaranteed 
investment contracts (GICs), which are commonly offered as a stable value 
fund investment option under now-ubiquitous participant-directed 401(k) 
plan designs.
92
 
 
 
91
 Generally, a mutual fund (open-end investment company) must redeem its securities 
within seven days of tender. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012); FRANKEL & SCHWING, supra note 
72, §§ 5.08[C][2], 26.01. 
 
92
 See DAN M. MCGILL ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 693 (9th ed. 
2010). 
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The utilization of 103-12 IEs by either DB or DC plans is very limited. 
That observation might indicate that pension plans make realty and other 
investments through partnerships in which plan holdings are kept below 
twenty-five percent, thereby avoiding characterization of the partnership’s 
property as plan assets.
93
 
The broad categories of defined benefit and defined contribution plans 
mask large variations in plan characteristics. Defined contribution plan, for 
example, is defined by reference to whether benefits are based solely on the 
amount of contributions credited to an individual account maintained on 
behalf of the employee, plus any income, expenses, gains, losses, and 
forfeitures (of the accounts of other participants, if applicable) which may 
be allocated to the account.
94
 DC plans are classified into a number of 
subsidiary types, according to the method of determining contributions and 
(sometimes) the nature of plan investments. The most common variety of 
DC plan today is the 401(k) plan, under which employee-participants may 
elect to contribute a portion of their wages or salary to the company’s 
retirement savings program on a pre-tax basis, rather than receiving it as 
current (taxable) cash compensation; the employer typically contributes as 
well, either by matching all or part of the employee’s elective deferral or by 
making non-elective contributions (i.e., contributions to all workers eligible 
to participate, regardless of whether or how much each chooses to defer). In 
contrast, under a money purchase pension plan (MPPP) the employer 
promises to make specified annual contributions to each participant’s 
account in an amount that is commonly set as a percentage of the 
employee’s current compensation (and which is independent of firm 
profits). Are these different DC plan types associated with significant 
 
 
93
 In 2008, the portion of single-employer DB plan assets reported as “Partnership/joint 
venture interests” increases with the overall level of plan assets, from an average of 0.5% for 
plans with below-median assets to 3.5% of total assets for the ten percent of plans having the 
highest total assets. In contrast, single-employer DC plans held hardly any partnership 
interests in 2008 (less than 0.1% on average), regardless of plan asset size. (Throughout this 
study any plan reporting no year-end assets is excluded from consideration, so plan asset size 
categories are determined without reference to the number of such zero-asset plans.) 
 
94
 ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2012); accord I.R.C. § 414(i). A defined 
benefit plan is a pension plan that is not a defined contribution plan. ERISA § 3(35), 29 
U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2012); accord I.R.C. § 414(j). Under a traditional DB plan, the employer 
promises a specified level of benefit payments (typically paid in the form of a life annuity) to 
provide support commencing on retirement, and the contributions necessary to fund the 
promised benefits are determined actuarially. The plan sponsor’s commitment, therefore, is 
fixed by reference to contributions (money going in) in the case of a defined contribution 
plan, and is fixed by reference to benefit distributions (money going out) in the case of a 
defined benefit plan. 
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differences in a plan’s utilization of indirect investment vehicles? 
Figure 5 presents the results for large 401(k) plans in 2008. The pattern 
is extremely similar to Figure 4, the composite picture for all DC plans. 
That result is not surprising, because in recent years the DC plan universe 
has come to be dominated by 401(k) plans. By 2008 about seventy-five 
percent of all DC plans were of the 401(k) type, and the proportion of active 
participants was about the same (see Figures 8 and 9). The authors also 
computed utilization rates of the same six types of independent investment 
vehicles by large profit-sharing plans and by large DC plans which allow 
participants to direct the investment of their accounts (not shown). In each 
case the results are essentially identical to the 401(k) plan results. The 
401(k) elective contribution feature is usually a component of a profit-
sharing plan, and over the last fifteen years most 401(k) plans sponsored by 
large companies have been amended to give participants control over the 
investment of their accounts, typically by allowing them to select among a 
menu of mutual fund investment options that offer a broad range of risk and 
return characteristics. Accordingly, the connection between 401(k) elective 
contribution features, profit-sharing plans, and participant-directed 
investments is so tight that one would expect the common pattern of 
utilization of indirect investment vehicles that is actually observed. 
The money purchase plan is a different creature entirely. Figure 6 
shows the extent of reliance on indirect investment vehicles by large 
MPPPs in 2008. Here the pattern is subtly but noticeably different. As with 
DC plans overall (compare Figure 4), hefty reliance on mutual funds is the 
norm, and with a dramatic drop in the top decile. Mutual fund usage by 
MPPPs — unlike DC plans in general or 401(k) plans — actually falls 
below master trust investments for plans in the largest-asset category. Most 
significant is the surprisingly large reliance of MPPPs on insurance 
company general account investments (in all asset ranges except the top 
decile), giving insurer-intermediaries an importance in this sector of the 
pension plan universe that they do not have elsewhere. Money purchase 
plans are a dying breed, apparently as a result of changes in the limits on 
deductibility of contributions enacted in 2001, which eliminated employers’ 
incentive to offer a MPPP in addition to a 401(k) or other profit-sharing 
plan.
95
 (See Figure 8.) As the rapid demise of the MPPP overlaps the period 
of the EFAST filing system, the authors also looked for changes in the 
utilization of indirect investment vehicles by large MPPPs between 2000 
and 2008. Although 4135 large MPPPs filed returns reporting non-zero 
assets in 2000, compared to only 2289 in 2008, the utilization pattern of 
 
 
95
 See WIEDENBECK, supra note 22, at 349–51. 
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indirect investment vehicles in 2000 (not shown) is very similar to Figure 6. 
The cash balance plan is a DB subtype that is often referred to as a 
hybrid plan because the promised benefit is a lump sum payment based on a 
specified percentage of the participant’s annual compensation (pay credits) 
augmented by an assumed rate of return (interest credits), and so mimics the 
yield of a DC plan (specifically, a MPPP). In contrast, most DB plans — 
often referred to as “traditional” pension plans — promise benefits in the 
form of a life annuity, the amount of which is specified by a formula that 
typically takes into account some measure of the worker’s average 
compensation and length of service. The resemblance between cash balance 
and MPPPs raises the question whether cash balance plan utilization of 
indirect investment vehicles is more like the pattern for DB plans or 
MPPPs. Figure 7 displays the answer. Perhaps surprisingly, in the aggregate 
cash balance plan indirect investments are quite similar to DB plans 
generally (compare Figure 3), and notably dissimilar to the MPPP pattern 
(Figure 6).
96
 
 
 
96
 See infra notes 144-146, Figure 15, and accompanying text. 
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E.  DFE Asset Holdings 
Having investigated the general patterns of pension plan utilization of 
indirect investment vehicles, we now briefly review the general patterns of 
investment allocation by DFEs themselves. Aggregate descriptive statistics 
concerning asset holdings of the four types of DFEs were compiled by 
extracting from the Department of Labor’s raw data files all annual reports 
by DFEs.
97
 DFE-type codes were used to categorize the filings,
98
 and 
Schedule H balance sheet data for each type of DFE were combined. 
A simple comparison of the total net assets held in each type of DFE 
(i.e., MTIA, CCT, PSA, or 103-12 IE) with the aggregate amounts reported 
by all large pension plans as the year-end value of interests held in DFEs of 
the same type reveals some fundamental facts. Virtually all MTIA assets are 
attributable to large pension plans; small plans (meaning plans with less 
than 100 participants) do not utilize MTIAs to any significant extent.
99
 This 
fact is consistent with the finding discussed earlier that the utilization of 
MTIAs by “large” plans increases dramatically with the size of total plan 
assets (see Figures 3 and 4). The net assets of the other three varieties of 
DFEs substantially exceed the reported value of large pension plan 
interests. Large pension plans account for sixty-five percent of PSA net 
assets in 2008; the remaining thirty-five percent is apparently attributable to 
PSA interests held by small plans or governmental plans.
100
 Unlike MTIAs 
 
 
97
 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The Department of Labor’s edited data do 
not include DFE filings. See EBSA, supra note 42, and accompanying text. 
 
98
 The first question on Form 5500 calls for identification of the type of filing entity. 
E.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. & PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY 
CORP., FORM 5500, ANNUAL RETURN/REPORT OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN, Part I, Line A(4) 
(2008), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2008-5500-mp.pdf. If the DFE box is checked the filer 
is instructed to enter a one-letter code to specify the type of DFE (M = MTIA; C = CCT; P = 
PSA; E = 103-12 IE). See 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 15. 
 
99
 For 2008 the total amount reported by all large pension plans (both DB and DC) as 
the year-end value of interests in MTIAs was $1.195 trillion, while the total net assets 
reported by MTIAs (reduced by amounts reported as interests held in other MTIAs to avoid 
double counting) was $1.150 trillion. The small (<4%) apparent excess of the value of plan 
interests over the total net asset value of MTIAs is presumably attributable to differences in 
reporting year or reporting errors. In contrast, the Department of Labor’s 2008 DFE 
statistical summary reports the total amount invested by private pension plans in MTIAs as 
$1.216 trillion, and total MTIA assets of $1.389 trillion. EBSA, supra note 4, tbls.2, 10. The 
difference apparently stems from variation in the underlying data sets; in conducting its 
analysis EBSA seems to have corrected or supplemented the raw filings. See supra note 38. 
To date EBSA has not published its methodology. 
 
100
 For 2008 the total amount reported by all large pension plans as the year-end value 
of interests in PSAs was $109 billion, while the total net assets reported by PSAs (reduced 
WIEDENBECK07013 6/30/2013  9:29 PM 
638 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  32:591 
 
and PSAs, ownership of interests in CCTs and 103-12 IEs is not limited to 
employee benefit plans.
101
 Not surprisingly, therefore, interests held by 
large pension plans account for only a minority of the net assets of these 
two types of DFEs: specifically, large plans hold in the aggregate about a 
forty percent stake in all CCTs, and only a twelve percent interest in 103-12 
IEs.
102
 Small plans might own some of the remaining interests, but 
probably very little, because CCT assets not attributable to large plans 
greatly exceed the total net assets of all small plans in 2008,
103
 while as 
 
by amounts reported as interests held in other PSAs to avoid double counting) was $167 
billion. In contrast, the Department of Labor’s 2008 DFE statistical summary reports the 
total amount invested by private pension plans in PSAs was $112 billion, and total PSA 
assets of $193 billion. EBSA, supra note 4, tbls.2, 10; see supra note 99. Although the 
Department of Labor labels the $112 billion as “private pension plan” assets invested in 
PSAs, implying that the number includes investments by both large and small plans, other 
reported data suggest that $112 billion in fact represents only large plan investments. 
Compare id. tbl.10 with id. tbl.12 ($112 billion reported as total original large plan PSA 
interests). 
To avoid regulation as an investment company, PSA participation must be limited to 
qualified retirement plans and governmental plans. See supra note 79. Governmental plans 
are not subject to ERISA and not required to file annual reports, ERISA §§ 4(b)(1), 3(32), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32) (2012), while the simplified financial information reported 
by small pension plans that is available in digital form (Schedule I) does not break out DFE 
investments. Therefore, while it seems clear that PSA assets in excess of large plan interests 
are traceable either to small plans or governmental plans, the data do not allow us to 
precisely determine their respective contributions. The PSAs in our data set reported a total 
of 1,065,693 investor “plans” on Schedule D, Part II, of which 830,147 could be confidently 
identified as pension plans, but only 177,118 of those (21%) were large pension plans. See 
supra tbl.1, note 88 and accompanying text. This indicates that PSAs are heavily utilized by 
small pension plans (which is consistent with longstanding experience in the industry), and 
so it seems likely that the 35% of PSA net assets not accounted for by large plan investments 
are overwhelmingly attributable to interests owned by small private pension plans. 
 
101
 See supra notes 67, 84–86 and accompanying text. MTIA participation is limited to 
plans of a single employer or of a commonly controlled group of employers. 
 
102
 For 2008 the total amount reported by all large pension plans (both DB and DC) as 
the year-end value of interests in CCTs was $514 billion, while the total net assets reported 
by CCTs (reduced by amounts reported as interests held in other CCTs to avoid double 
counting) was $1.281 trillion. In contrast, the Department of Labor’s 2008 DFE statistical 
summary reports the total amount invested by private pension plans in CCTs was $525 
billion, and total CCT assets of $1.796 trillion. EBSA, supra note 4, tbls.2, 10. 
For 103-12 IEs the corresponding numbers are $26.1 billion and $211 billion. 
According to EBSA the total amount invested by private pension plans (both DB and DC) in 
103-12 IEs was $27.7 billion, and total 103-12 IE assets of $279 billion. EBSA, supra note 
4, tbls.2, 10. 
 
103
 The aggregate net assets of all small plans in 2008 was approximately $514 billion. 
See EBSA, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2008 FORM 5500 ANNUAL 
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seen earlier, interests in 103-12 IEs reported by large plans are concentrated 
in the very highest asset plans (Figures 3 and 4). 
Somewhat surprisingly, given the dominance of MTIA investments by 
large plans (see Figures 1-2), in 2008 the largest number of DFE filings 
came from CCTs,
104
 and CCTs also reported the greatest total assets ($2.13 
trillion versus $1.28 trillion held in MTIAs). The higher CCT asset total is 
apparently attributable to two factors.
105
 First, recall that a CCT that is a 
common trust fund is not restricted to holding assets from qualified plans, 
but may also contain funds attributable to private trusts, estates, and UGMA 
custodianships.
106
 Second, CCT asset totals seem to be afflicted by 
substantial double counting, due to the fact (discussed below) that CCTs 
invest heavily in other CCTs. If CCT investments in other CCTs are 
subtracted, CCT total assets in 2008 are reduced to $1.47 trillion, while 
eliminating MTIA investments in other MTIAs only reduces MTIA total 
assets to 1.26 trillion. 
Figure 10 presents a side-by-side comparison of the proportionate asset 
allocation of the four types of DFEs among the investment categories 
reported on Schedule H.
107
 (Those categories of investments in which no 
 
REPORTS, tbls.A3, D7 (2010), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2008pensionplanbulletin.pdf 
($4.577 trillion total net assets all plans, of which $4.063 reported by large plans). 
 
104
 The 2008 counts are as follows: 1484 MTIAs reported $1.28 trillion in gross total 
assets; 2877 CCTs reported $2.13 trillion total assets; 1819 PSAs reported $195 billion total 
assets; and 402 103-12 IEs reported $316 billion total assets. The DFE counts reported in the 
preceding sentence include only DFEs of each type reporting non-zero assets. See supra note 
38. The corresponding numbers, according to the Department of Labor, are as follows: 1693 
MTIAs with $1.39 trillion in gross total assets; 3448 CCTs with $1.80 trillion total assets; 
2128 PSAs with $193 billion total assets; and 433 103-12 IEs with $279 billion total assets. 
EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.1. 
 
105
 A third possibility should also be noted: conceivably, small pension plans (those 
covering fewer than 100 participants) might utilize CCTs much more heavily than MTIAs, 
just the reverse of the relative importance of these investment vehicles for large plans 
(Figures 1-2). While this could be a contributing factor, its significance is clearly limited, 
inasmuch as the total assets of all small private plans in 2008 was only $526 billion, which is 
considerably less than the difference between reported CCT and MTIA total assets in 2008. 
See EBSA, supra note 103, tbl.C1. 
 
106
 See supra text accompanying notes 66–73. 
 
107
 The data presented in Figure 10 tracks the DFE balance sheet report contained in the 
Department of Labor’s 2008 DFE statistical summary. EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.2. One 
important difference is that the Department of Labor numbers do not report DFE ownership 
interests in lower-tier DFEs, instead allocating those lower-tier DFE interests to other asset 
categories according to the nature of the lower-tier DFE’s investments. As a result of this 
difference, the size ranking of the non-DFE asset categories reflected in Figure 10 
corresponds to the ranking reported in the EBSA balance sheet, but the actual proportions 
(portfolio shares) differ. 
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type of DFE invested at least one percent of total assets are not displayed.) 
Consider first the investment by DFEs in other DFEs. As would be 
expected, some MTIA funds (only two percent) are invested in another 
MTIA, but because a master trust may pool assets only from plans 
sponsored by either a single employer or a group of commonly-controlled 
employers, other types of DFEs, which pool assets from unrelated 
employers, do not put funds in an MTIA.
108
 While cross investment in other 
DFE varieties is not restricted, it is noteworthy that the only substantial 
DFE investment in PSAs is by other PSAs, and likewise the only substantial 
DFE investment in 103-12 IEs is by other such investment entities.
109
 
Because banks and insurance companies compete as financial 
intermediaries, the absence of cross investment between CCTs and PSAs 
may come as no surprise. 
CCTs, however, are a special case — they place a large part of their 
funds in other CCTs (about thirty-one percent in 2008), and MTIAs also 
entrust a big chunk of their total assets to CCTs (about eighteen percent).
110
 
This link might be attributable to the fact that a bank must serve as trustee 
or custodian of a master trust, while a CCT is also a bank-maintained 
investment fund: perhaps bank-managed master trusts tend to invest in 
CCTs sponsored by the same bank. The heavy reliance of CCTs on 
investments in other CCTs would be consistent with banks creating a set of 
core funds with differing risk and return characteristics (e.g., corporate debt 
instruments having various ratings and maturities, domestic or foreign 
equities having varying levels of capitalization, dividend policies, industry 
concentration), and combining those core funds in various ways to build a 
broad range of feeder funds, each with a distinct investment policy or 
temporal horizon (such as target date funds). That CCTs invest an unusually 
large share of their total assets in common stock (nearly thirty percent), but 
put an unusually small amount (less than one percent) in registered 
investment companies (mutual funds) might suggest that other CCTs fill the 
role that mutual funds play in the investment portfolio of other DFEs. 
Putting tiered or nested DFE investments to one side, perusal of Figure 
10 reveals several additional differences in investment concentration 
between DFE types. Only MTIAs hold any employer securities (4.6%);
111
 
 
 
108
 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. The Department of Labor’s DFE 
statistical summary reports that in 2008 no PSAs or 103-12 IEs invested in an MTIA, while 
ninety-five MTIAs invested in another MTIA. It also reports ten CCTs holding interests in 
an MTIA. EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.9. 
 
109
 Accord EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.10. 
 
110
 Id. 
 
111
 Id. tbl.2. 
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because other DFEs pool assets from plans of unrelated employers, they 
cannot hold “employer” securities per se. As noted previously, CCTs 
exhibit a distinctively high level of investment in common stock and low 
utilization of mutual funds. CCTs hold a lot more of their money in interest-
bearing accounts (presumably in the same bank that is trustee
112
) than other 
DFEs (11% compared to 3-5%). Only insurance company PSAs take 
substantial stakes in real property (nearly 14%);
113
 they also make more 
direct loans than other DFEs, and one might suspect that this is traceable to 
commercial real estate lending (construction and permanent financing). 
The 103-12 IE is an outlier in its high levels of investment in U.S. 
government securities and “other investments.”
114
 The “other investment” 
category includes state and municipal securities, as well as options, index 
futures, repurchase agreements, collectibles, and other personal property.
115
 
Hedge funds that are owned twenty-five percent or more by benefit plan 
investors (so that the plan asset look-though rule applies) may qualify as 
103-12 IEs,
116
 and large holdings in debt securities, options, and derivatives 
would be consistent with the arbitrage-based short-term trading (based on 
proprietary models) that characterizes the business strategy of many hedge 
 
 
112
 A statutory exemption from ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules authorizes a bank 
that is a plan fiduciary to invest all or part of the plan’s assets in deposits in the fiduciary 
bank itself, provided that the deposits bear a reasonable rate of interest and that such 
investment is expressly authorized by a provision of the plan or by an independent fiduciary 
who has the power to direct the bank with respect to such investment. ERISA 
§ 408(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(4)(B) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-4 (2012). 
It is also possible that the pressure on banks to maintain adequate capital reserves in the 
face of declining asset values caused by the financial crisis might have induced CCT trustees 
to allocate an unusually large share of CCT assets to deposits in the sponsoring bank in 
2008. The objective of this study is to link direct and indirect pension plan investments in 
2008, so no comprehensive analysis of prior-year financial data has been undertaken. 
Nevertheless, reports of CCT asset holdings in 2007 were extracted from the Department of 
Labor’s raw data files for comparison with the 2008 CCT portfolio allocation described 
above. The combined CCT balance sheet data (Schedule H) show that interest-bearing cash 
accounted for 7.1% of aggregate CCT investments in 2007, which is substantially less than 
the 11.3% average portfolio share reported in 2008. This finding suggests that the onset of 
the 2008 credit crunch may have contributed to the higher CCT utilization of interest-bearing 
accounts relative to other DFEs. Indeed, the two largest changes in CCT portfolio allocations 
between 2007 and 2008 were a 4.2 percentage point decrease in common stock holdings and 
a 4.2 percentage point increase in interest-bearing cash. 
 
113
 EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.2. 
 
114
 Id. 
 
115
 See 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 30 (instructions for Schedule H, line 
1(c)(15), “other investments”). 
 
116
 Beth J. Dickstein & Robert A. Ferencz, Qualified Plans — Investments, BNA TAX 
MGMT. PORTFOLIO NO. 377, at A-26 (2007). 
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funds.
117
 The asset category designated “joint ventures” should be 
mentioned in this connection, because most hedge funds and private equity 
funds are organized as partnerships or joint ventures, and if benefit plan 
participation in such a fund is under twenty-five percent (so that the assets 
of the fund are not deemed plan assets under the look-through rule), then an 
ownership interest in the fund would be reported as a “joint venture” 
interest.
118
 While Figure 10 displays asset allocations, it should be noted 
that the 103-12 IE is also an outlier on the liability side. Total liabilities, as 
a share of total (gross) assets fall between 7% and 9% for MTIAs, CCTs, 
and PSAs, but the liability proportion for 103-12 IEs is more than 21%. 
Qualified plans rarely buy securities on margin or otherwise borrow to 
acquire or improve non-realty investment properties, because doing so 
would trigger the tax on unrelated debt-financed income.
119
 Therefore one 
 
 
117
 Andrew W. Needham & Christian Brause, Hedge Funds, BNA TAX MGMT. 
PORTFOLIO NO. 736, at A-1 to A-7 (2007); STAFF OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 33–36 (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF HEDGE FUND REPORT]. Private equity 
funds that are owned 25 percent or more by benefit plan investors (so that the plan asset 
look-though rule applies) may also qualify as 103-12 IEs. Dickstein & Ferencz, supra note 
116. Private equity funds are turn-around specialists that buy a controlling interest in 
underperforming companies and enhance their value through expert management and 
strategic realignment. Hence a private equity fund is heavily invested in common stock 
which it typically holds for several years. The 21% of 103-12 IE assets consisting of 
common stock may be attributable, to some extent, to private equity funds. 
 
118
 Of course, partial ownership of an unincorporated operating company would also 
appear in the joint venture asset category. The instructions for Schedule H, line 1(c)(5), for 
reporting investments in “Partnership/joint venture interests” state: 
Include the value of the plan’s participation in a partnership or joint venture if the 
underlying assets of the partnership or joint venture are not considered to be plan 
assets under 29 CFR 2510.3-101. Do not include the value of a interest in a 
partnership or joint venture that is a 103-12 IE. Include the value of a 103-12 IE 
in 1c(12). 
2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 30. 
 
119
 I.R.C. §§ 514, 511(a); Elliot Knitwear Profit Sharing Plan v. Commissioner, 614 
F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1980) (income generated by securities purchased on margin subject to tax 
on unrelated debt-financed income). Indeed, entry of an amount on Schedule H, line 1i, 
“Acquisition indebtedness,” is virtually a concession that the tax on unrelated debt-financed 
income applies. See 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 30–31 (indicating that the 
acquisition indebtedness liability category does not pertain to real property and applies as 
provided in Code section 514(c)). 
If certain conditions are satisfied, a qualified plan may incur debt to acquire real 
property without triggering the tax on unrelated business taxable income (UBTI). I.R.C. 
§ 514(c)(9). Therefore the prospect of tax exposure does not discourage leveraged real estate 
investments by qualified plans, although the exception is subject to special rules where a 
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would expect that plan liabilities would typically constitute only a small 
share of gross assets. Even though leverage is a major component of most 
hedge fund investment strategies,
120
 the larger liability proportion for 103-
12 IEs would be consistent with many of these investment vehicles being 
hedge funds, because hedge funds commonly take steps to insulate tax-
exempt investors from the tax on unrelated-debt-financed income by 
interposing a corporation (a so-called “blocker”) between the main fund and 
its tax-exempt investors.
121
 
The DFE asset allocations presented in Figure 10 are dominated by a 
small number of high-asset DFEs. In the case of MTIAs, in 2008 the top 
10% of MTIAs, ranked by total assets, accounted for 70% of all MTIA 
assets. Similarly, the top decile of CCTs reported 75% of all CCT assets, 
while the top deciles of PSAs and 103-12 IEs contributed 83% and 66% of 
all PSA and 103-12 IE holdings, respectively. Due to the dominance of a 
small number of high-asset DFEs, the average asset allocations presented 
here mask some variations in asset allocations by the large majority of 
DFEs of the same type. To take one striking example, virtually all PSA 
investments in real estate and “other loans” (likely real estate financing) is 
traceable to the 10% of PSAs with the largest total assets. In contrast, PSA 
investments in registered investment companies (mutual funds), which 
account for more than 90% of the total assets of half of all PSAs (i.e., 910 
PSAs with non-zero but below-median total assets), falls to under 20% of 
the total assets of the 182 PSAs in the top asset decile. 
Before linking DFE asset holdings to their investor-plans, it may be 
worthwhile to consider how much pooling DFEs accomplish. From the data 
in Table 1 we can determine minimum values for the average numbers of 
pension plans (large and small) that invest in each type of DFE: 3.1 for 
MTIAs, 19.4 for CCTs, 450 for PSAs, and 9.0 for 103-12 IEs. The 
corresponding minima for the average number of large pension plans that 
 
plan is a partner in a partnership that holds real estate. I.R.C. § 514(c)(9)(B)(vi), (c)(9)(C), 
(c)(9)(E). Another debt-financed income exception provides that participation in securities 
lending programs will not trigger UBTI. I.R.C. § 514(c)(8). 
 
120
 See SEC STAFF HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 117, at 37–38. 
 
121
 If the fund is a partnership for tax purposes its borrowing is attributed to the 
partners, giving rise to UBTI exposure for tax-exempt investors. The feeder corporation 
“blocker” strategy prevents this result because shareholders (unlike partners) are not 
attributed a share of the underlying debt. That is, the hedge fund’s leveraged returns belong 
to its corporate partner, and do not pass through to the corporation’s shareholders. Where the 
feeder corporation is organized offshore (is a foreign corporation), the blocking can be 
accomplished without incurring corporate income tax. Needham & Brause, supra note 117, 
at A-46 to A-47; Vadim Mahmoudov, Rafael Kariyev & Daniel Backenroth, Playing With 
Blocks: Testing a Fund’s Blocker Allocations, 133 TAX NOTES 993 (Nov. 21, 2011). 
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invest in each type of DFE are: 2.4 for MTIAs, 9.8 for CCTs, 96.2 for 
PSAs, and 5.2 for 103-12 IEs.
122
 Interestingly, the number of pension plan 
investors does not greatly increase with increases in the size of MTIA total 
assets — on average, high-asset MTIAs have only a few more participating 
pension plans than low-asset MTIAs, but they pool much larger investments 
from each participating plan. The number of pension plans per DFE does 
increase substantially with the amount of DFE total assets for other types of 
DFEs, and dramatically so in the case of PSAs, as illustrated by the solid 
lines in Figure 11. The average number of participating plans grows from 
less than five in the lowest PSA asset deciles to 2407 in the highest decile! 
Although high-asset PSAs are pooling investments from many more plans, 
the size of the average plan investment also increases with the size of PSA 
total assets. As shown by the dotted lines in Figure 11, the average pension 
plan investment in MTIAs and PSAs rises with the size of the DFE’s total 
assets. The graph also reveals that PSAs pool much smaller investments 
than MTIAs (note the logarithmic scale). Due to the prevalence of non-
pension-plan investors in CCTs and 103-12 IEs, the average plan 
investment in these indirect investment vehicles cannot be determined 
simply by dividing total reported CCT or 103-12 IE assets by the number of 
participating pension plans. Therefore, DFE assets per plan is not a 
meaningful measure of the average pension plan investment and is not 
shown for CCTs or 103-12 IEs. 
  
 
 
122
 These averages are referred to as minima because they are computed without 
reference to the large number of unidentified DFE investors, some (perhaps many) of which 
might be pension plans. See supra note 88.  The data reported in the Department of Labor’s 
DFE statistical summary apparently do not permit computation of the average number of 
pension plans per DFE. Table 1 of the Department of Labor summary reports the “number of 
invested private pension plans” for each DFE type, but where a plan invests in several DFEs 
of the same type — for example, where a high asset plan invest in five MTIAs — it seems to 
be counted only once. See EBSA, supra note 4, tbl.1, n.1 (multiple counting of plan if it 
invests “in more than one type of DFE”). Another table displays the distribution of DFEs by 
type among specified ranges of the number of private pension plan investors. Id. tbl.3. That 
distribution seems consistent with the ordinal ranking of the average number of private 
pension plans per DFE type reported here (i.e., MTIA < 103-12 IE < CCT << PSA), but it 
does not allow computation of precise averages. 
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III.  METHODOLOGY 
The complete protocol developed to accomplish first-order matching of 
DFE assets and liabilities to the pension plans that hold interests in DFEs is 
set forth in a web appendix to this article.
123
 Here we merely highlight the 
major challenges encountered in the effort to link the balance sheet data and 
describe how they have been addressed. 
The source data for large pension plans, including identifying 
information, plan characteristics, and balance sheet numbers, are taken from 
EBSA’s Pension Research Files. The Pension Research Files have been 
subjected to a correction process involving both automated global edits 
(checking filings for internal consistency) and manual plan-specific edits to 
enhance data quality.
124
 DFE filings are not included in the Pension 
Research Files
125
 and therefore are more apt to be infected with errors, 
including missing information and reported asset/liability positions that do 
not match reported totals. In addition, pension plan Schedule D filings, 
which are necessary to link a plan to the DFEs in which it invests, are not 
part of the Pension Research Files and must also be taken from the unedited 
raw data sets.
126
 
Perhaps due to errors in the raw data, a significant fraction of reported 
plan interests in DFEs could not be successfully matched to an identifiable 
DFE. For 2008, large pension plans reported 411,971 non-zero year-end 
interests in MTIAs, CCTs, PSAs, or 103-12 IEs. Of these 411,971 reported 
distinct investments, 184,089 actually represent interests in CCTs or PSAs 
that did not file Form 5500 and so were not DFEs. Excluding those interests 
in non-DFE CCTs and PSAs, 227,882 reported large plan interests in DFEs 
remain. Ultimately, 41,173 of those interests (18.1%) could not be matched. 
We attempted reverse matching — that is, going from DFEs to the 
investor-plan — in an effort to raise the matching success rate.
127
 Each 
DFE must file Schedule D, Part II, to identify all plans that hold an interest 
in the DFE. Unfortunately, however, Part II does not call for reporting 
current values of those interests. Consequently, a plan’s failure to 
 
 
123
 Research Protocol, supra note 37. The web appendix also reports the complete 
results of this study, including summary spreadsheets showing the aggregate portfolio 
composition of various categories of large single-employer pension plans and multi-color 
versions of the figures presented in this article. 
 
124
 Actuarial Research Corporation, supra note 41, at 8–10. 
 
125
 Id. at 4. 
 
126
 See id. at 23–31 (reported source for all original data used in Pension Research Files 
is either Form 5500, Schedule H, or Schedule I; no data taken from Schedule D). 
 
127
 See Research Protocol, supra note 37, at Step 11. 
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intelligibly identify a DFE in the plan’s Schedule D, Part I, can be fixed 
where the DFE identifies the plan in the DFE’s Schedule D, Part II, but 
only if the plan’s filing contains only one garbled link. If there are multiple 
bad links, then even if each unidentified DFE adequately identifies the 
investor-plan, there is no way to know how much of each DFE’s assets and 
liabilities to attribute to the investor-plan. For 2008 only 6190 bad links are 
attributable to plans that have exactly one bad link, and so reverse matching 
made only a modest improvement in our attribution success rate. In the end, 
this additional step salvaged only an additional 1320 links. 
Even if a pension plan reports that it holds an interest in a specifically-
identified DFE, often the data proved unusable due to inconsistencies 
between the amounts reported on the plan’s Schedule D and Schedule H. 
For example, it is surprisingly common for an investor-plan to report on 
Schedule D a dollar value for its end-of-year interest in one particular CCT 
that is substantially greater than the amount the plan reports on its Schedule 
H balance sheet as the end-of-year dollar value of its interest in all CCTs! 
In such circumstances it is impossible to know how much of the DFE’s 
assets and liabilities should be attributed to the investor-plan. Once this 
problem came to light the protocol was revised to filter out irretrievably 
defective filings. All large pension plans were sorted into three groups. 
Group 1 plans did not invest in any DFE at any time during the year (and so 
linking of indirect investments is not at issue).
128
 Group 2 plans reported a 
DFE investment, but the amounts reported as the value of the plan’s 
investment in each separate DFE of a given type (MTIA, CCT, PSA, or 
133-12 IE) on Schedule D, when summed, did not match the amount 
reported on Schedule H as the plan’s interest in DFEs of that type. Group 3 
consists of those plans that utilized one or more DFEs and filed 
substantially consistent data on Schedules D and H.
129
 The Group 2 plans, 
 
 
128
 Plans that did not invest in a DFE at any time during the year were identified by two 
conditions: (1) no non-zero entry appeared in any of the Schedule H DFE asset categories; 
and (2) either no Schedule D was filed, or the plan filed a Schedule D reporting interests only 
in CCTs or PSAs that were identified as not being DFEs. 
 
129
 Specifically, a plan is put into Group 3 if the reported Schedule H amount for the 
EOY value of the plan’s interest in a given type of DFE is not more than $10 different from 
the sum of the amounts reported on Schedule D as the plan’s investment in DFEs of that 
type, and that condition is met for all four types of DFEs. CCTs and PSAs identified on 
Schedule D as not filing their own Form 5500 for the year (non-DFE CCTs and PSAs) are 
excluded from the sum used for comparison with the reported Schedule H value of interests 
in CCTs or PSAs. (In accordance with the regulations, the Form 5500 instructions require 
such non-DFE CCTs and PSAs to be identified on Schedule D, but their assets and liabilities 
must be allocated among the appropriate specific balance sheet categories on Schedule H, 
not reported as a unitary interest in a CCT or PSA. A non-DFE CCT or PSA is identified by 
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containing irretrievably defective financial data, were not run through the 
linking protocol, but a regression analysis was conducted to identify factors 
(plan, return, or investment characteristics) associated with bad filings.
130
 
Group 3 plans were linked to their DFEs and plan balance sheets were 
reconstructed to properly categorize assets and liabilities attributed from the 
DFEs in which they invested. This sorting of large pension plans reporting 
non-zero assets in 2008 produced the following breakdown: Group 1 (no 
DFE), 38,063 plans; Group 2 (inconsistent information on Schedules D and 
H), 15,198 plans; Group 3 (consistent DFE information), 27,247 plans. 
Accordingly, the large pension plan asset allocations (portfolio 
compositions) reported below exclude nineteen percent of all plans, or some 
thirty-six percent of plans that invested in one or more DFEs. 
The accuracy of our matched results is also impaired somewhat by 
disparities in the reporting periods used by DFEs and their investors. 
Schedule D must be filed by a plan or DFE that invests in an MTIA, CCT, 
PSA, or 103-12 IE at any time during the plan year.
131
 The beginning and 
end-of-year (BOY and EOY) values of a plan’s interest in each category of 
DFE are reported on the plan’s Schedule H, but on Part I of Schedule D, the 
plan reports only the EOY value of its interest in each separate DFE (as 
well as each CCT or PSA that does not file as a DFE). DFE investments 
attributed to a plan reflect the DFE’s EOY Schedule H asset holdings and 
liability positions.
132
 Consequently, if a plan uses an annual reporting 
period that differs from the reporting period used by a DFE in which the 
plan invests, then the information imputed from the DFE’s balance sheet 
will correspond to a different date (the end of the DFE’s reporting year) 
than the date that controls the plan’s balance sheet (end of the plan year). 
Where the snapshot of a plan’s indirect holdings is taken at a different time 
than the snapshot of the plan’s direct holdings, pasting them together 
creates a composite picture with some distortion. Due to portfolio changes 
intervening between the end of the DFE’s year and the end of the plan year, 
the linked results for a particular plan may generate categorical asset and 
liability allocations that never actually occurred. These inaccuracies for a 
 
the sponsor’s name and EIN, while a plan number of 000 is used to indicate that the CCT or 
PSA in question did not file as a DFE.) Any plan that is not in Group 1 (because it invested 
in a DFE) and does not satisfy the reporting consistency tests for Group 3 is classified in 
Group 2. 
 
130
 See infra Part IV.D and Table 2. 
 
131
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 25. 
 
132
 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 11 provides: “Form 5500 filed for the DFE, 
including all required schedules and attachments, must report information for the DFE year 
(not to exceed 12 months in length) that ends with or within the participating plan’s year.” 
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particular plan are presumably mitigated in the summary data because other 
plans will be imputed indirect holdings that err in the opposite direction, 
leaving average overall asset allocation data largely unaffected. (In the 
interval between the end of the DFE year and the plan year, for example, 
one DFE may increase its holdings of common stock while another reduces 
its position.) More important, most large pension plans and DFEs use the 
calendar year as their reporting period, so the linked balance sheet results 
are dominated by apples-to-apples comparisons.
133
 
Another limitation of our results concerns the matter of tiered DFEs. 
As explained previously, both MTIAs and CCTs report that a substantial 
share of their holdings consists of interests in other CCTs (in 2008, 18% 
and 31%, respectively).
134
 To obtain a complete picture of the portfolio 
composition of a plan that invests in an MTIA that owns an interest in a 
CCT (for example), a share of the CCT’s assets and liabilities (determined 
by the MTIA’s proportionate ownership of the CCT) should first be 
attributed to the MTIA, then reattributed to the investor-plan (along with a 
portion of all the direct holdings of the MTIA) according to the plan’s stake 
in the MTIA. Such multilayered indirect investments are not restricted to 
two tiers of DFEs, as illustrated in Figure 12. Multilevel asset and liability 
imputation requires identifying lowest-tier DFEs (those that hold no interest 
in another DFE) and applying an iterative process for tracing a share of 
their assets and liabilities up through chains of indirect ownership. DFE 
Schedule H filings are unedited (unlike the Pension Research Files, only the 
uncorrected raw data are available), as are all Schedule D filings, which 
makes multilevel attribution (tracing assets and liabilities through tiered 
DFEs) particularly susceptible to bad links and cascading reporting errors. 
To avoid those complications, our current protocol only links a share of 
DFE assets and liabilities to a large pension plan that directly owns an 
interest in the DFE. If the DFE in question (DFE1) holds an interest in 
another DFE (DFE2), that interest is attributed to the investor-plan but 
reported as an interest in either an MTIA, CCT, PSA, or 103-12 IE, 
according to DFE2’s type; the DFE2 asset and liability composition will not 
be reflected in the composite balance sheet constructed for the plan that 
owns a share of DFE1. Hence our current matching protocol preserves only 
second-level asset and liability categories. If multilevel asset and liability 
 
 
133
 Actuarial Research Corporation, supra note 41, at 3 (80% of pension plans file on a 
calendar year basis). The authors’ tally from 2008 DFE Form 5500 filings shows that 87% of 
DFEs of all sorts filed a return for a plan year beginning on January 1. The proportion is 
93% in the case of MTIAs, which are associated with higher-asset plans (see supra Figures 3 
& 4). 
 
134
 See supra Figure 10. 
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imputation could be comprehensively implemented (with all links properly 
identified), then the resulting pension plan balance sheets would have no 
entries in the asset categories reflecting interests in MTIAs, CCTs, PSAs, 
and 103-12 IEs.
135
 
  
 
 
135
 To pursue the example in Figure 12, our protocol attributes to Plan A1 A1% of the 
$U of MTIA direct investments, preserving their proper characterization, plus A1% of the 
$V invested in CCT1, but this latter amount is reported as an undifferentiated interest in a 
CCT. Proper multilevel attribution would attribute to Plan A1 A1% of the $U MTIA direct 
investments, plus [V/(W + X)] of $W CCT1 assets (other than its interest in CCT2), plus 
A1% of [V/(W + X)] of $X CCT2 assets, and the attributions from CCT1 and CCT2 would 
consist of a share of each underlying investment held by these DFEs. 
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IV.  RESULTS 
A.  DB and DC Plan Allocations 
1. Findings of the Current Study 
Composite summary results of the linking of large single-employer 
defined benefit plans with their first-tier DFE investments based on 2008 
returns are presented in Figure 13A. The graph shows the proportion of 
gross assets invested in the Schedule H asset categories by all 3620 single-
employer DB plans that did not utilize a DFE in 2008 (Group 1 plans, 
shown as blue columns) alongside the corresponding average aggregate 
asset allocations (direct and indirect) of the 3348 linkable single-employer 
plans that invested some portion of their assets in one or more DFEs (Group 
3 plans, shown as red and pink stacked columns). Of the twenty non-DFE 
Schedule H asset categories, the twelve that comprise the largest shares of 
gross assets for plans that do not use DFEs are displayed on the left side of 
the graph, with the four DFE types shown to the right. For plans using 
DFEs, the stacked column format displays the relative contribution of direct 
and indirect investments. The red column height represents plan assets 
owned directly and reported on the plan’s Schedule H balance sheet, 
including (on the right side of the graph) reported interests in the four types 
of DFE. The pink portions of the columns show the incremental increase in 
asset shares resulting from attributing DFE assets to the proper balance 
sheet categories. By focusing on the pink increments it can be seen that 
tracing MTIA assets back to plans holding interests in master trusts 
translates into substantial increases in the shares of plan investments 
allocated to common stock and both corporate and government debt (recall 
that state and municipal bonds are included in “Other Investments”). 
Consistent with Figure 1, observe the dominance of MTIA interests prior to 
linking. Proper attribution reduces undifferentiated DFE interests, so there 
is no pink surplus atop the red DFE columns. Instead, the adjacent green 
and yellow stacked columns display post-linking DFE interests. The green 
component represents second-tier DFE interests, reflecting the fact that the 
assets of successfully linked first-tier DFEs include some interests in other 
DFEs, and the yellow part of the column shows the extent to which reported 
first-tier DFE interests of each type could not be successfully matched to 
the assets of a particular DFE (unmatched residue). Observe that linking 
actually increases proportionate CCT holdings because first-tier MTIAs and 
CCTs invest a significant portion of their assets in lower-tier CCTs. The 
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side-by-side comparison of plans that do not and do use DFEs (blue and 
red/pink columns, respectively) indicates that for many asset categories 
proper identification of indirect investments substantially reduced the 
apparent disparity in portfolio composition between Group 1 and Group 3 
plans, but there are a few striking exceptions. Indirect interests create or 
increase a disparity in the shares of plan portfolios allocated to two asset 
categories, preferred corporate debt and receivables. Also observe that 
linking barely narrows the wide disparity in DB plan utilization of RICs 
(registered investment companies, or mutual funds). 
On average, single-employer defined benefit plans that use DFEs hold 
far more assets than plans that do not (by a factor greater than six in 2008). 
Consequently, the post-linking portfolio variation seen in Figure 13A might 
be attributable to differences in asset size rather than DFE utilization per se. 
To isolate those factors, Figure 13B shows the same comparison for a 
subset of single-employer defined benefit plans reporting total gross assets 
of at least $166.14 million but less than $383.66 million. Different numbers 
of Group 1 and Group 3 plans fall within this range, but the distribution 
throughout the range and the average assets of the groups are very similar. 
(Combining all Group 1 and Group 3 single-employer DB plans and 
ranking them by asset size, this range corresponds to the 90th to 95th 
percentile.) The figure reveals that the stark difference in mutual fund (RIC) 
utilization is not due to differences in plan asset levels. 
Corresponding graphs showing the results of linking large single-
employer defined contribution plans with their first-tier DFE investments 
based on 2008 returns are presented in Figures 14A and 14B. (The 
“imputed assets” category shown in Figure 14A reflects a common 
reporting error among DC plans, as explained in the margin.
136
) DC plans 
 
 
136
 Many DC plan returns (10,795 in 2008) report $0 in all Schedule H asset categories 
except participant loans, but also report as their total assets a number that is larger than the 
reported amount of participant loans. This unidentified excess was coded as another asset 
category, “imputed assets.” This situation appears almost exclusively among plans that do 
not use DFEs (Group 1 plans) having low levels of total assets. On average, imputed assets 
made up fully 25% of the portfolio of Group 1 DC plans with less than $1.33 million in 
gross assets (roughly the bottom 20% of DC plans ranked by assets size), but only 0.5% for 
plans with gross assets greater than $14.69 million (about the top 20% of DC plans). 
We hypothesize that such reports correspond to plans that invest all assets in mutual 
fund shares. If so, Schedule H should report only one entry in the asset categories, namely, 
an interest in registered investment companies (RICs, ordinarily mutual funds), and the same 
number should be reported as the plan’s total assets, provided that the plan does not make 
loans to participants. If it does allow participant loans, then the technically correct reporting 
would be to show entries in two asset categories, both for interests in RICs and loans to 
participants. (The loan asset amount might well also show up in the “other liability” category 
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make less use of DFEs than DB plans do, and the linking failure rate for DC 
plans is somewhat lower. (Compare the yellow segments representing 
unlinked first-tier DFE interests with the red columns reporting direct DFE 
holdings in Figures 14A and 13A.) Just as for DB plans, single-employer 
defined contribution plans that use DFEs tend to hold more assets than 
plans that do not, so a comparison of the portfolio compositions of a subset 
of DC plans of comparable size that do and do not employ DFEs is shown 
in Figure 14B.
137
 Observe that the apparent difference in mutual fund (RIC) 
utilization between DC plans that do and do not invest through DFEs (seen 
in Figure 14A) disappears when the comparison is limited to plans of 
comparable asset size (Figure 14B). This is contrary to the finding for DB 
plans. The overall average disparity in common stock investments also 
vanishes when plans with similar asset levels are compared, but only if 
common stock held in DFEs is taken into account. On the other hand, 
disparities in DC plan holdings of employer securities, interest bearing 
cash, and “other investments” (including state and local bonds, options, and 
derivatives) are seen in both Figures 14A and 14B. 
2. Comparison with EBSA Summary Statistics 
In April 2012, the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) 
of the Department of Labor released its first-ever DFE statistical report, 
which, like the current study, focuses on returns filed in 2008. The report 
contains counts of DFEs, counts of private pension plans invested in DFEs, 
and asset counts.
138
 Most relevant to this study, the EBSA report also 
includes a table that takes assets reported by pension plans as invested in 
DFEs and distributes them into the other financial asset categories 
according to the composition of the DFE portfolios in which the pension 
plans invest.
139
 These composite balance sheets, reporting the aggregate 
financial position of all large private DB plans and all large private DC 
 
if the plan borrows from a bank to raise the cash to make loans to participants.) Where 
participant loans are allowed, total gross assets should equal the sum of the RIC holdings and 
participant loans. However, because ERISA provides that the underlying assets of a RIC are 
not plan assets (in contrast to many other types of indirect investments), inexpert trustees 
who do no more than pass contribution dollars along to one or more mutual fund companies 
might not view themselves as holding any plan assets other than claims for repayment of 
plan loans. 
 
137
 The range is from $32.91 million to $72.69 million in reported gross assets, 
constituting the 90th to 95th percentile of single-employer DC plans classified in either 
Group 1 or Group 3 when ranked by asset size. 
 
138
 EBSA, supra note 4. 
 
139
 Id. tbl.11. 
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plans in 2008, can be readily converted into proportionate asset allocations 
and compared to the DB and DC plan results obtained by the current study. 
EBSA’s results are compared with the current study in Figures 13C 
(DB plans) and 14C (DC plans). Each graph uses a four-column 
presentation, where the first (blue) column in each cluster displays the 
EBSA linked results. The following three columns show the results of the 
current study, as follows: the second (red) column shows the composite 
average asset allocation of all plans included in this study (after linking 
those that use DFEs); the third (green) column separately displays the asset 
allocation of those plans that do not use DFEs (Group 1); and the fourth 
(purple) column separately displays the asset allocation of those plans that 
use DFEs and report consistent information on Schedules D and H (Group 
3). Thus, the last two columns in each cluster display the same information 
presented in Figure 13A in the case of DB plans, or 14A for DC plans, but 
without the internal breakdown (stacked columns) between direct and 
indirect investments for plans that use DFEs. 
Concentrating on the DB comparison (Figure 13C), the first impression 
may be that the EBSA numbers do not square well with the current study. 
Some important differences in approach may explain the disparities, 
however. EBSA’s numbers ostensibly reflect complete linking of DFE 
assets and liabilities to investor pension plans. Apparently, this includes 
tracing the assets of second (and lower) tier DFEs back to plans holding an 
interest in a first-tier DFE, such as when an MTIA or CCT has some of its 
assets invested in another CCT. Moreover, EBSA reports no unmatched 
residue resulting from unidentified DFEs (bad links). In sharp contrast to 
the current study, EBSA reports all post-linking DFE interests as zero. 
Observe the absence of blue columns in the four DFE categories on the 
right side of the graph. If EBSA’s methodology is reliable, then the DFE 
interests shown in red (which represent stakes in lower-tier DFEs plus 
reported first-tier DFE interests that were not successfully associated with a 
uniquely-identified DFE) should account for all differences in the height of 
the blue and red columns reporting non-DFE investments. Presumably, 
EBSA addressed the pervasive problem of poor quality returns (inconsistent 
reporting of DFE interests on Schedules D and H, as well as inadequately 
identified DFEs) either by contacting filers and calling on them to correct 
the data, or by application of some sort of sampling technique. 
Unfortunately, EBSA has not yet released an explanation of its 
methodology. Besides EBSA’s announcement of comprehensive successful 
linking, some of the disparity in Figure 13C may be attributable to EBSA’s 
inclusion of all large DB plans, in contrast to the current study which 
focuses on large single-employer plans. 
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The DC plan comparison in Figure 14C shows much closer 
correspondence between this study and EBSA’s report of portfolio 
composition. That correspondence presumably results from the lower 
overall utilization of DFEs by DC plans and our higher MTIA linking 
success rate relative to DB plans. Observe that the greatest disparity lies in 
the share of the portfolio devoted to common stock, while CCTs — which 
we have seen invest most heavily in common stock (see Figure 10) — 
represent the largest unlinked DFE interest. 
3. Discussion 
The question that motivated this investigation is whether material 
differences in portfolio composition are associated with a pension plan’s 
use of indirect investment vehicles. To a first approximation, Figure 13B 
presents an initial tentative answer for single-employer DB plans in 2008. 
This side-by-side comparison of plans holding similar amounts of assets 
which either do or do not use DFEs (shown by the red/pink and blue 
columns, respectively) reveals remarkably consistent average portfolio 
compositions once indirect investments are properly identified. Indeed, 
these two groups of plans allocate substantially equivalent average portfolio 
shares to most asset categories; dramatic disparities appear only for 
holdings of registered investment company shares and interests in insurance 
company general accounts. The data suggest that CCT interests might 
substitute for RIC holdings among plans using DFEs. The picture for 
single-employer DC plans in 2008 (Figure 14B) also displays wide-ranging 
consistency. Here, RIC holdings constitute almost sixty percent of pension 
portfolios whether or not a plan uses DFEs; significant differences are 
found only in the share of assets allocated to employer securities (ESOPs, 
apparently, do not employ DFEs), interest-bearing cash, and other 
investments. Generally speaking, these data are consistent with DFE 
utilization for the purpose of obtaining increased diversification and 
economies of scale, not for a nefarious objective of obscuring pension 
plans’ overall portfolio composition. 
At this stage of the research, however, several big caveats must bracket 
such an optimistic conclusion. First, these results depict average aggregate 
asset allocations. At the individual plan level it is entirely possible that 
disclosed direct holdings of conservative investments (say, U.S. 
government bonds and blue-chip stocks) are combined with practically 
undisclosed indirect investments through DFEs in positions that have very 
different risk, return and liquidity characteristics (such as hedge funds, for 
example). As a further step, the authors investigated the degree of 
correlation between direct and indirect investments at the individual plan 
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level, as reported below in Part IV.C. 
Second, due to the extreme generality of the asset categories reported 
to the Department of Labor by large pension plans and DFEs on their 
Schedule H balance sheets, even an apparently perfect correspondence 
between a particular pension plan’s direct and indirect investments — equal 
proportions invested in “common stocks” for example — would not rule out 
wildly divergent investment characteristics. The common stocks held by the 
plan and a CCT in which it holds an interest might represent stakes in 
different industries, publicly-traded enterprises or privately-held operating 
companies, companies incorporated domestically or abroad, etc. This 
granularity of the digitized financial data forestalls attempts to drill down 
further into the truly consequential characteristics of pension plan portfolio 
composition. This limitation is explored further in Part V.
140
 
Third, the results displayed here exclude all plans that invested in DFEs 
but reported inconsistent amounts as the current value of their year-end 
interests in DFEs on Schedule D and Schedule H (Group 2 plans, as defined 
earlier). If there were a deliberate effort to hide the nature of plan 
investments, such inconsistent reporting would surely facilitate it. The 
characteristics of unlinkable Group 2 plans are investigated below in Part 
IV.D. 
Finally, finding corresponding overall asset allocations by plans that do 
and do not utilize DFEs does not rule out major disparities on the liability 
side of the balance sheet, and there are some. Among large single-employer 
DB plans using DFEs (Group 3 plans), indirect liabilities (that is, DFE 
liabilities linked to plans) are many times larger than the total direct 
liabilities reported on Schedule H by the investor-plans. Direct liabilities 
account for only 31% of the total liabilities (direct and linked from DFEs) 
of all Group 3 DB plans, but for plans in the bottom half of the DB plan 
asset distribution direct liabilities amount to only 1% of the total liabilities! 
Looking at liabilities as a share of assets, direct liabilities of all Group 3 DB 
plans are approximately 2.8% of reported Schedule H gross assets, while 
total liabilities (direct and linked from DFEs) come to 8.4% of total gross 
assets (direct and linked from DFEs). The ratio of direct liabilities to gross 
assets reported on Schedule H, it should be noted, is approximately the 
same for DB plans that do not use DFEs as for those that do (Groups 1 and 
3, respectively). Therefore, the high levels of indirect liabilities are not 
simply substituting for lower direct liabilities in Group 3 plans. DB plan 
DFE investments are associated with much larger liabilities than direct 
investments, and that DFE debt is currently hidden from plan 
 
 
140
 See infra text accompanying notes 169–180. 
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participants.
141
 
The data displayed in Figures 13B and 14B represent weighted average 
portfolio allocations for a subset of high-asset (90th to 95th percentile) 
single-employer DB and DC plans in 2008. The investment behavior of 
plans of this size does not necessarily reflect the asset mix of a “typical” 
plan. As demonstrated previously, there are systematic differences in DFE 
utilization as the size of the investor-plan’s total assets increase (Figures 3-
7). Does the categorical composition of pension plan portfolios, taking into 
account linked first-tier DFE investments, also vary with asset size? To 
check for variations in portfolio composition by plan asset size, single-
employer DB and DC plans were separately grouped into ten asset size 
ranges, each containing equal numbers of plans, and the average portfolio 
composition before and after linking with DFEs was computed for each 
such decile. The authors then compared the results for mid-range plans 
(fifth and sixth deciles) with the numbers for high asset plans and the 
overall weighted averages.
142
 The unmatched results discussed earlier show 
extensive utilization of registered investment companies (RICs, typically 
mutual funds) by most plans, with that large portfolio share dropping 
precipitously among plans in the highest asset categories (top one or two 
deciles), which show a corresponding surge in MTIA investments (Figures 
3 and 4). The drop in RIC usage by high-asset plans survives linking first-
tier DFE investments; mid-range DB plans (fifth and sixth deciles) that use 
DFEs hold about 25% of their assets in RIC shares, while the overall 
weighted average is only 7%. Although important, RIC shares do not 
dominate MTIA portfolios (see Figure 10), so attributing MTIA assets to 
the high-asset plans that invest through MTIAs does not counteract the drop 
in direct ownership of mutual funds. That finding poses another question: 
 
 
141
 Indirect liabilities dominate direct liabilities for Group 3 DC plans as well, but in 
this case the ratio of total liabilities (direct and linked) to total gross assets (direct and linked) 
among DC plans that use DFEs (Group 3) is actually less than the ratio of liabilities to gross 
assets for DC plans that do not use DFEs (Group 1). This lower overall debt ratio appears to 
be attributable to the very high level of liabilities characteristic of leveraged ESOPs, which 
typically do not use DFEs (See infra Figure 19A and text accompanying note 156). If one 
focuses exclusively on the large majority of DC plans that are 401(k) plans, the liability 
pattern is similar to the findings for DB plans. Indirect liabilities dominate direct liabilities 
for Group 3 401(k) plans and the ratio of total liabilities (direct and linked) to total gross 
assets (direct and linked) among 401(k) plans that use DFEs (Group 3) is greater than the 
ratio of liabilities to gross assets for 401(k) plans that do not use DFEs (Group 1). 
 
142
 Results not displayed here. The complete results of this study, including summary 
spreadsheets showing the aggregate portfolio composition of various categories of large 
single-employer pension plans, are posted as a web appendix at http:// 
invisiblepensioninvestments.wustl.edu/. 
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what actually substitutes for the drop in RIC holdings by high-asset plans? 
Due to the high matching failure rate for DB plans, interests in MTIAs 
(meaning mostly unmatched MTIAs) still constitute substantially larger 
shares of the portfolios of top-decile than mid-range plans after matching. 
For DB plans, however, linking does reveal an increase in utilization with 
plan asset level of preferred corporate debt securities and partnership/joint 
venture interests. For DC plans, examination for variation in post-linking 
portfolio composition by plan asset level shows a substantial fall in RIC 
investments only at the very top of the asset spectrum (roughly, the top 5% 
of DC plans), and that drop in RIC holdings is counteracted by notable 
growth in the share of assets that the largest DC plans invest in employer 
securities (ESOPs, presumably), and CCT interests (largely second-tier 
CCTs). 
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B.  Other Plan Characteristics 
Beyond the great DB/DC divide, some differences in the type and 
extent of indirect investments were observed earlier among some pension 
plan sub-varieties. (Compare Figure 5 with Figure 6.) Once first-tier DFE 
asset holdings are properly attributed to their investor-plans, to what extent 
do these differences translate into real variation in categorical portfolio 
composition? 
Figure 15 shows the asset allocations of large single-employer cash 
balance plans for 2008, again separating those plans that do not use DFEs 
(Group 1, blue columns) from those that report consistent information 
concerning their DFE investments on Schedules D and H (Group 3, 
red/pink columns). Comparing Figure 15 with Figure 13A, the similarity 
between the portfolio compositions of cash balance plans and all DB plans 
is striking.
143
 Cash balance plans comprise only about ten percent of large 
single-employer DB plans, so the resemblance does not derive from 
numerical dominance. Although categorized as defined benefit programs, 
cash balance plans promise a benefit that mimics defined contribution plans 
and so represent a kind of hybrid arrangement.
144
 From that perspective, 
close alignment between cash balance and traditional DB pension plan 
portfolio compositions is surprising. From an historical point of view, 
however, comparable investment behavior becomes understandable. The 
number of cash balance plans has grown dramatically since 1990, but not 
by instituting altogether new plans.
145
 Instead, a cash balance plan is 
 
 
143
 This finding is consistent with the similarity, noted earlier, in the utilization of 
indirect investment vehicles by cash balance and traditional DB plans. See supra Figure 7 
and text accompanying note 96. 
 
144
 Specifically, a cash balance plan promises a benefit equal to the balance of a 
hypothetical account which is credited annually with a specified percentage of pay and 
notional interest tied to the accumulated balance of the account. Such pay credits and interest 
credits make cash balance plans functionally equivalent to money purchase pension plans, 
which are defined contribution plans. See Kyle N. Brown, Specialized Qualified Plans — 
Cash Balance, Target, Age-Weighted and Hybrids, BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO 352-3d, at 
A-37 to A-66(12) (2007); Cooper v. IBM Pers. Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2006). 
Under a cash balance plan, however, the employer is legally obligated to pay the full 
promised benefit (balance of the hypothetical account) regardless of the actual investment 
performance of the pension fund assets, and that allocation of risk causes the arrangement to 
be classified as a defined benefit rather than a defined contribution plan. ERISA § 3(34), 
(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34), (35) (2012); I.R.C. § 414(i), (j). 
 
145
 See generally TOWERS WATSON, PENSIONS IN TRANSITION: RETIREMENT PLAN 
CHANGES AND EMPLOYER MOTIVATIONS 4–5, 8–9 (2012). 
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commonly created by amendment of a preexisting traditional pension plan 
that has already accumulated substantial investment assets, and the 
participants of such a converted plan are entitled to receive benefits earned 
prior to the amendment without diminution.
146
 The data appear to support 
the inference that continuation of an established fund of investment assets 
and preservation of the plan’s prior benefit structure causes the prior 
investment pattern to endure for an extended period following conversion to 
the cash balance formula. 
A massive exodus from traditional defined benefit pension plans has 
occurred over the past 25 years. While some employers converted 
traditional pension plans into cash balance plans (as described in the prior 
paragraph), many others simply froze their traditional pension plans, 
amending them to cease further benefit accruals, with the result that 
thereafter an active employee’s services would generate no additional 
benefits. Often a new defined contribution plan, typically a 401(k) plan, 
was instituted in conjunction with such a freeze, allowing workers to 
continue to earn retirement savings. Although its accrued liability does not 
increase, a frozen DB plan may continue to operate for many years, 
receiving annual employer funding contributions, accumulating assets, and 
paying benefits.
147
 Does a frozen plan’s investment behavior differ from 
that of an ongoing DB pension program? Figure 16 shows that, at the level 
of broad categorical asset allocations, the portfolios of frozen and ongoing 
traditional DB plans are very much alike. (Cash-balance plans have been 
excluded from the sets of both frozen and ongoing plans.) The differences 
are small and those that are discernible seem consistent a marginally greater 
reliance by frozen plans on lower-risk fixed-income investments. U.S. 
government securities, corporate debt (both preferred and other), interest-
bearing cash, and “other investments” (which include state and local 
 
 
146
 ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 411(d)(6). For cash balance 
conversions after June 29, 2005, benefits accrued prior to amendment under the traditional 
pension formula must be preserved and in addition benefits earned by post-amendment 
service under the new cash balance formula must serve to increase total benefits, not be 
credited against the pre-amendment entitlement (i.e., so-called “wear away” transition rules 
are treated as prohibited age discrimination). ERISA §§ 204(b)(5)(B)(ii), (iii), 203(f)(3), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1054(b)(5)(B)(ii), (iii), 1053(f)(3) (2012); I.R.C. § 411(b)(5)(B)(ii)-(iii), (a)(13). 
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 109TH CONGRESS 329, 460–68 (Comm. Print 2007); Brown, 
supra note 144, at A-57 to A-60. 
 
147
 Ordinarily, frozen plans continue operations because they have not accumulated 
sufficient assets to pay all accrued benefits. Under current law, a financially healthy sponsor 
cannot voluntarily terminate an underfunded plan. See ERISA § 4041(a)(1), (b), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1341(a)(1), (b) (2012). 
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government bonds), all contribute somewhat greater proportions of the 
holdings of frozen than ongoing plans. Figure 16 groups the data differently 
than the preceding graphs (Figures 13A, 13B, 14A, 14B, and 15) and uses 
different column colors to highlight that fact. The quantity displayed in 
each asset category includes both direct and linked first-tier DFE holdings 
by plans of the designated type, including both plans that do not use DFEs 
and those that do (i.e., Group 1 and Group 3 plans are combined). Because 
investments by plans utilizing DFEs are not segregated, the stacked column 
display is not used, and the DFE numbers shown on the right side of the 
graph represent only the combination of linked second-tier DFE holdings 
and residual first-tier DFE investments that were not successfully linked. 
The most important feature of Figure 16 is that the comparison group does 
not consist of all ongoing traditional pension plans. Instead, a matching 
procedure was used to randomly select, for each frozen plan included in the 
data set, three ongoing plans having an amount of reported gross assets that 
falls within 2 percent of the reported gross assets of the frozen plan.
148
 As 
we have already seen, portfolio composition varies (often dramatically) 
with the level of total plan assets. This matching procedure was developed 
to neutralize such size effects, providing a comparison of portfolio 
allocations between plans of different types that is not confounded by 
differences in the range or distribution of total asset levels between those 
different plan types.
149
 Such an apples-to-apples comparison is particularly 
important here, because smaller DB plans are much more likely to be 
frozen, yet any narrow asset range selected to compare frozen and ongoing 
plans nets very few frozen plans. 
Turning to the DC universe, Figure 17A presents the corresponding 
comparison for all large single-employer 401(k) plans in 2008. To restrict 
consideration to plans of similar asset size (recall that plans using DFEs 
tend to have higher total assets than those that do not), Figure 17B presents 
weighted average portfolio allocations for a subset of high-asset (90th to 
 
 
148
 Where the same ongoing plan was randomly selected as a match for more than one 
frozen plan it is included in the comparison set of ongoing plans only once. Hence the 
number of matched ongoing plans is less than three times the number of frozen plans. Also, 
where only one or two ongoing plans report total gross assets falling within a two-percent 
collar of the asset level of a particular frozen plan, the frozen plan and the available matches 
were retained in the data set, but this was the case for only one frozen single-employer plan. 
Frozen plans were excluded from the comparison if no ongoing plans satisfied the asset-level 
screen, which ruled out thirty-eight plans. 
 
149
 The authors investigated using a matching protocol that would screen for 
comparability of both gross and net asset levels, but the simpler gross asset test was adopted 
because gross and net asset levels were found to track very closely for the overwhelming 
majority of plans. 
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95th percentile) single-employer 401(k) plans. With one notable exception, 
the 401(k) plan portfolios illustrated in Figures 17A and 17B very closely 
track the results for DC plans generally, shown in Figures 14A and 14B. 
That’s to be expected inasmuch as 401(k) plans account for roughly 75 
percent of the DC plan universe. The exception is also quite understandable. 
Unlike DC plans in general, employer securities account for a much smaller 
share of 401(k) plan portfolios. The difference is due to the fact that a large 
share of all employer securities are held by ESOPs, a subtype of DC plan 
that is included in Figures 14A and 14B but is largely (though not entirely) 
excluded from the set of 401(k) plans.
150
 
Figures 18A and 18B present the corresponding picture for money 
purchase pension plans (MPPPs), a type of DC plan that has dramatically 
declined in importance since 2001.
151
 The overall pattern is quite similar to 
the asset allocation of 401(k) plans (Figures 17A and 17B), and hence to 
DC plans generally (Figures 14A and 14B). One stark difference is the 
much higher utilization of MTIAs by MPPPs (compare Figures 18A and 
17A). The reason seems to lie in the fact that a larger proportion of MPPPs 
fall into higher asset ranges (recall that MTIA usage is very heavily 
concentrated among the largest plans, as shown in Figures 4-6) than 401(k) 
plans.
152
 To eliminate the disparity in asset size, Figure 18C compares the 
set of single-employer money purchase pension plans with a randomly-
selected matched sample of 401(k) plans having comparable asset levels. 
Asset size matching was performed using the procedure described earlier in 
connection with Figure 16,
153
 and as in that figure, the quantity displayed in 
each asset category includes both direct and linked first-tier DFE holdings 
by plans of the designated type, including both plans that do not use DFEs 
and those that do. (The highest-asset money purchase plan was excluded 
from the data sets compared in Figure 18C, however, because it reports an 
unusual asset mix — fully 43% as “other receivables” — and its size is so 
 
 
150
 ESOPs can include an elective contribution element, and such a cash-or-deferred 
component would cause the plan to be classified as both an ESOP and a 401(k) plan. I.R.C. 
§§ 401(k)(2), 4975(e)(7). That combination, however, is relatively rare. According to the 
Department of Labor, in 2008 there were 7048 ESOP filings, of which 1374 had a 401(k) 
feature and 5672 did not. By way of comparison, in 2008 there were 510,209 401(k) plans 
that were not ESOPs. EBSA, supra note 103, tbl.D16 at 62. 
 
151
 See supra Figure 8 and note 95. 
 
152
 The Department of Labor reports average assets per large (i.e., 100 or more 
participants) MPPP of $41.6 million in 2008; the corresponding number for large 401(k) 
plans is $29.7 million. See EBSA, supra note 103, author’s computation from Tables A1(a), 
D1 (2192 large MPPPs; total gross assets $91.194 million), D4, and D9 (64,263 large 401(k) 
plans with $1,910,099 million total assets). 
 
153
 See supra text accompanying notes 148–149. 
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large that inclusion substantially alters the weighted average portfolio of all 
MPPPs.
154
) The close correspondence between MPPP and 401(k) plan asset 
allocations, combined with the heavy reliance on registered investment 
company (mutual fund) shares, suggests that money purchase plans have, 
like 401(k) plans, largely shifted to responsibility for investment decision-
making to participants, who are a choice between a menu of mutual funds, 
as permitted by ERISA § 404(c).
155
 And in fact, 69.5 percent of the 1,260 
single-employer MPPPs reported plan characteristics codes indicating that 
the plan provided for total or partial participant direction of investments, as 
did 96.8 percent of the 3,606 matched 401(k) plans in the comparison 
group.  
The results for large single-employer employee stock ownership 
(ESOP) plans in 2008 are given by Figures 19A and 19B. An ESOP is 
defined in part as a plan designed to invest primarily in employer stock,
156
 
and so it comes as no surprise that for ESOPs that do not use DFEs (Group 
1) employer securities is the largest asset category (70% or more) by a wide 
margin. The shock lies in the asset allocation of plans that use DFEs. To 
judge by these numbers, many of these plans are not properly classified as 
ESOPs because they do not invest primarily in employer stock even once 
indirect investments are properly characterized! No ready explanation for 
this apparently dramatic misreporting comes to mind. 
  
 
 
154
 The excluded plan, with $4.28 billion in reported gross assets in 2008, is the 
American Airlines, Inc. Pilot Retirement Benefit Program Variable Income Plan. 
 
155
 ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). 
 
156
 ERISA § 407(d)(6), (5), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(6), (5) (2012); I.R.C. §§ 4975(e)(7), 
(8), 409(l); Treas. Reg. § 54.4975-11 (as amended in 2012). 
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In unionized workforces, benefits are the subject of collective 
bargaining and the union often plays an important role in monitoring the 
implementation of the agreement. Therefore one might expect to find 
differences in the portfolio composition of pension plans according to 
whether or not the plans are products of collective bargaining. 
Multiemployer plans are the best-known example of collectively-bargained 
pension programs, but those plans cover employees of multiple unrelated 
employers, have a unique joint governance structure (involving union and 
employer representatives), are subject to special funding and termination 
insurance rules, and tend to have very high asset levels.
157
 Consequently, if 
multiemployer plans exhibit different investment allocations than single-
employer plans, the difference could be attributable to a number of factors 
other than union monitoring. To avoid those confounding variables, the 
authors looked for a unionization effect by sorting the 2008 single-
employer pension plan balance sheet data into subsets composed of plans 
that were or were not collectively-bargained.
158
 DB and DC plans were 
sorted separately, and the subsets (collectively bargained or not) were 
further subdivided into groups consisting of those plans that did not utilize 
DFEs (Group 1), and those using DFEs and filing consistent information to 
permit linking (Group 3). 
Figure 20 displays the major categorical asset allocations of 
collectively-bargained and non-collectively-bargained large single-
employer defined benefit plans in 2008. It adopts a clustered stacked 
column format similar to that used in the preceding charts, but each asset 
category now contains four columns rather than two. This four-column 
display permits side-by-side presentation of the portfolio compositions of: 
(1) non-collectively bargained plans that do not use DFEs (dark blue single 
columns); (2) linkable non-CBA plans that use DFEs (red/pink stacked 
columns); (3) collectively-bargained plans that do not use DFEs (light blue 
 
 
157
 See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2012) (governance structure); ERISA §§ 3(37) 
(definition of multiemployer plan), 302(a)(2)(C), 304 (minimum funding standards), 
4001(a)(3) (definition for purposes of PBGC insurance program), 4006 (premium rates), 
4022A (benefits guaranteed), 4201–4303 (withdrawal liability), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(37), 
1082(a)(2)(C), 1084, 1301(a)(3), 1306, 1322a, 1381–1453 (2012). In 2008, 2939 
multiemployer plans reported total assets of $471.5 billion, or on average $160 million per 
plan; fewer than one percent of single employer plans in 2008 reported assets comparable to 
or greater than this amount. EBSA, supra note 103, tbls.A6, B2. 
 
158
 The sort was based upon responses to Form 5500, Part I, question C, which 
instructs: “If the plan is collectively bargained, check here.” According to the Department of 
Labor tallies, in 2008 there were 46,926 single-employer plans, of which 3399 were 
collectively bargained and 43,526 were not. Of the 667,156 single-employer DC plans in 
2008, only 7627 were collectively bargained. EBSA, supra note 103, tbl.A6. 
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single columns); and (4) linkable CBA plans that use DFEs (orange/salmon 
stacked columns). Also like the preceding charts, the right side of the graph 
shows the utilization and linking results for the four types of DFEs. 
Figure 20 should be compared with Figure 13A, showing the 
composite results for all large single-employer DB plans regardless of 
collective bargaining status. So, does unionization of the covered workforce 
affect DFE utilization or the categorical composition of pension plan 
portfolios, taking into account linked first-tier DFE investments? The 
answer for large single-employer DB plans seems to be very little. When 
DB plans are segregated by collective bargaining status only two 
conspicuous disparities emerge. First, collectively-bargained plans make 
substantially greater use of master trust investments than do non-CBA plans 
(76% versus 51%). Curiously, however, a larger proportion of all non-CBA 
plans that use DFEs fall into the highest asset ranges than is the case for the 
CBA plans that use DFEs. Hence higher reliance on MTIA investments by 
union plans is not attributable (as it was in so many other cases) to higher 
average asset levels. Second, an exceptionally large proportion of MTIA 
interests held by collectively-bargained plans could not be successfully 
linked to the underlying MTIA investments. Even though the amount 
reported by an investor-plan as the year-end value of its interest in MTIAs 
on Schedule H matched the total MTIA values reported on Schedule D (that 
is, we are dealing with potentially linkable Group 3 plans), it is unusually 
common for these collectively-bargained DB plans to fail to intelligibly 
identify the particular MTIAs in which they hold an ownership stake. 
Indeed, there is a much higher rate of unlinked first-tier MTIA investments 
among DB plans overall than among DC plans (15% versus 3%, as shown 
in Figure 13A and Figure 14A), and Figure 20 reveals that exceptional 
failure rate to be almost entirely attributable to collectively-bargained 
plans.
159
 Why collectively-bargained DB plans are far more likely to file 
defective Schedule D information is a mystery. One wonders whether some 
sponsors of collectively-bargained DB plans might be blunting union 
oversight by engaging in deliberate obfuscation. The situation at least looks 
suspicious. 
Figure 21 gives the corresponding breakdown between collectively-
bargained and non-CBA large single-employer DC plans in 2008, again 
using a four-column format and showing the contributions of the direct and 
indirect holdings of plans that use DFEs by means of stacked columns. 
Figure 21 should be compared with Figure 14A, showing the composite 
results for all large single-employer DC plans regardless of collective 
 
 
159
 But see infra text accompanying note 167. 
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bargaining status. There is a very close correspondence between Figure 14A 
and the Figure 21 columns representing asset allocations of plans that are 
not collectively bargained for the simple reason that collectively-bargained 
plans are a very small segment of the DC universe. (Note the low “n” 
reported in Figure 21 for each group of CBA plans.) Comparing the CBA 
and non-CBA portfolios, the most salient difference is the higher reliance 
on MTIAs by collectively-bargained plans (45% versus 26% for non-CBA 
plans using DFEs). Yet this greater utilization of MTIAs by collectively-
bargained DC plans is not associated with a high linking failure rate, as was 
found for collectively-bargained DB plans. 
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C.  Plan-Level Correlations 
In order to evaluate individual plan behavior w e examine the 
correlation between direct plan investment in each non-DFE asset and 
liability category and first-tier DFE values for the same category. Figure 22 
presents these correlations together with ninety-five percent confidence 
intervals for large single-employer defined benefit plans in 2008. 
Categories with a positive correlation are depicted in boldface type and 
indicate that as plans hold a higher percentage of their assets (or liabilities) 
directly in the indicated category, their indirect investment in that category 
trends upward as well. The categories listed in italics have a statistically 
significant negative correlation between direct and indirect investment and 
evidence the opposite pattern. For the categories whose confidence intervals 
include zero, there is no evidence indicating association between the 
percentage of assets directly invested in a category and the percentage of 
assets indirectly invested in a category.
160
 Figure 23 reports the correlation 
results for defined contribution plans. 
 
  
 
 
160
 Categories listed in square brackets contained insufficient data to calculate a 
correlation. 
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Figure 22: Correlation between direct and indirect investments by large single-
employer defined benefit plans, 2008 (with 95% confidence intervals) 
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Figure 23: Correlation between direct and indirect investments by large single-
employer defined contribution plans, 2008 (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 
Strong negative correlations are seen for mutual funds (RICs), and in 
the case of DC plans, insurance company general accounts. Thus, an 
increase in a plan’s direct holdings of mutual fund shares is associated with 
investment in DFEs that allocate a lower proportion of their portfolios to 
mutual funds. It may be relevant that insurance company general account 
interests often correspond to guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), and 
under participant-directed DC plans a GIC investment option may be 
offered in conjunction with an array of mutual fund (RIC) choices. The 
dearth of other strong negative correlations seems to confirm that DFEs are 
not systematically employed to achieve categorically contrarian investment 
positions (i.e., divergent from a plan’s direct holdings). While DFEs could 
be exploited to obfuscate the broad categorical nature of plan investments, 
that ulterior usage doesn’t appear to be widespread. 
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D.  Characteristics of Plans Filing Inconsistent DFE Information 
In 2008, fifty-three percent of large pension plans reported investing in 
at least one DFE. Such plans are required to report the dollar amount of 
their DFE interests in two different ways. First, a plan must report the total 
amount invested in each of the four types of DFE on Schedule H. Second, 
Schedule D of Form 5500 calls for the plan to identify each specific DFE in 
which it invested, indicate the type of that DFE (as either MTIA, CCT, 
PSA, or 103-12 IE), and list the dollar amount invested. The sum of the 
Schedule H reporting of DFE investment should equal the sum of the DFE 
investment identified individually on Schedule D. Yet more than thirty-five 
percent of plans that invest in DFEs report inconsistent numbers on 
Schedule H and Schedule D.  Such inconsistent filings were excluded from 
the linking protocol — and therefore from the results and analysis presented 
above — because knowledge of the value of the plan’s interest in a DFE is 
required to impute the correct share of DFE holdings to the plan.
161
 Where 
the numbers on Schedules D and H do not mesh, it is not clear which 
numbers (if either) should control the imputation. In this section, we 
investigate the characteristics of plans that are likely to file inconsistent 
returns. 
The appropriate comparison group for inconsistent filers is the set of 
plans that invested in DFEs and reported consistent numbers on Schedule H 
and Schedule D. In 2008, 42,445 large plans reported investing in at least 
one DFE. Of these, 15,198 filed inconsistent returns. To identify factors 
associated with bad filings we use a probit regression model setting the 
outcome variable equal to one if a plan filed an inconsistent return and zero 
otherwise. The explanatory variables include the various pension plan types 
and a variety of characteristics that might plausibly influence the quality of 
the plan’s annual return. The results of the model are set forth in Table 2. 
Coefficients with an asterisk are statistically significant at a 0.05 level. 
 
  
 
 
161
 In the methodology explanation these unlinkable plans are referred to as Group 2 
plans. See supra text accompanying notes 128–129. Group 2 plans are identified in the web 
appendix to this article, together with the portfolio information each reported on Schedule H. 
http://invisiblepensioninvestments.wustl.edu/. 
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Table 2: Regression Model of Inconsistent Reporting on Schedule H and 
Schedule D by Large Single-Employer Plans, 2008 
 
 Coefficient Standard Error p-value 
Intercept -0.457* 0.122 0.001 
Total assets 0.000 0.000 0.340 
Total liabilities 0.000 0.000 0.118 
Total DFE investment (D1) 0.000 0.000 0.080 
Defined benefit -0.315* 0.117 0.007 
401(k) -0.341* 0.055 < 0.001 
ESOP -0.068 0.080 0.395 
Stock bonus 0.158 0.124 0.203 
Profit-sharing 0.148 0.114 0.192 
Money purchase 0.053 0.118 0.653 
Cash balance 0.048 0.067 0.475 
Accountant opinion    
Adverse -1.084 1.983 0.584 
Disclaimer -0.15* 0.028 0.000 
Not reported 1.984* 0.032 < 0.001 
Qualified 0.064 0.080 0.427 
Invested in at least one 000 
DFE 
4.431* 0.145 < 0.001 
Collective bargaining -0.24* 0.031 < 0.001 
Frozen plan -0.205* 0.061 0.001 
Large amount of “other 
investments” 
0.306* 0.058 < 0.001 
Data from OPR editor 0.374* 0.033 < 0.001 
Plan maturity -0.291* 0.056 < 0.001 
Participant direction    
Partial -0.140* 0.067 0.036 
Total -0.365* 0.048 < 0.001 
Any imputed assets 2.364* 0.200 < 0.001 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the amount of money involved does not appear 
to have much, if any, impact on inconsistent filing. Neither the amount of 
total assets nor total liabilities is statistically significant. The total dollar 
amount a plan invests in DFEs is not significant at a 0.05 level, but it is at a 
more relaxed 0.1 level. Defined benefit plans are less likely to file 
inconsistent returns than defined contribution plans. Similarly, 401(k) plans 
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are less likely to file inconsistent returns than plans without a cash-or-
deferred feature. The rest of the plan types are not significant; holding other 
variables constant, these plan types experience similar rates of inconsistent 
filing. 
Form 5500 is generally accompanied by an accountant’s opinion on the 
fairness and consistency of the presentation of the plan’s financial 
information, including Schedule H and the schedule of investment assets. 
The accountant is not required to examine or report on financial information 
relating to a DFE, nor does the accountant’s opinion certify the correctness 
of the annual return generally.
162
 The opinion is characterized on Schedule 
H as either “unqualified,” “qualified,” “disclaimer,” or “adverse.” An 
unqualified opinion indicates that the accountant has no reservations about 
the plan’s financial statements.
163
 This category serves as the baseline in 
our model. This variable produces some surprising results. An adverse 
opinion does not significantly raise the probability of an inconsistent return, 
but the estimate is unreliable due to the fact that the data contain only three 
instances of adverse opinions. More perplexing is the significant negative 
result for filings with an accountant’s disclaimer, which occurs where the 
accountant declines to express an opinion because the accountant has not 
performed an audit sufficient in scope to support a judgment on the fairness 
of the financial statements. These plans are actually less likely to file 
inconsistent DFE information than those with which an accountant finds no 
fault. Conversely, returns filed without an accountant opinion reported at all 
are more likely to be inconsistent. Finally, there are a substantial number of 
“qualified” opinions (meaning that the accountant opines that the plan’s 
financial statements are fair in all material respects except for one or more 
matters described in the opinion), yet these filings are not more likely to be 
inconsistent than those which are approved without qualification. 
The rest of the variables in the model all prove to be statistically 
significant. First consider factors that increase the probability of an 
 
 
162
 ERISA § 103(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (examination and opinion by independent qualified 
public accountant required), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(1)(B), (a)(3) (2012); 29 C.F.R. 
§§ 2520.103-1(b)(5) (rule for large pension plans), 2520.103-8 (limit on scope of 
examination and report for assets held by bank or insurance carrier, including DFEs that are 
MTIA, CCT or PSA), 2520.103-12(d) (limit on examination and report concerning 103-12 
IE) (2012). 
 
163
 An unqualified opinion reports the accountant’s conclusion “that the plan’s financial 
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial status of the plan as of the end 
of the period audited and the changes in its financial status for the period under audit in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” or another comprehensive 
accounting system such as the cash basis. 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 33 (Sch. H, 
line 3(a)(1)). 
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inconsistent return. As explained earlier, a CCT or PSA may file its own 
Form 5500, in which case it is a DFE, but it is not obligated to do so.
164
 A 
plan that invests in a CCT or PSA that does not file as a DFE must allocate 
its share of the underlying assets and liabilities of the CCT or PSA to the 
separate asset and liability categories on Schedule H (instead of simply 
including the net value of the plan’s overall interest in the trust or account 
as the value of an interest in a CCT or PSA). In addition to allocating the 
underlying assets of the indirect investment vehicle on Schedule H, the plan 
is also required to file a Schedule D identifying the CCT or PSA, even 
though it does not file as a DFE. Such a non-DFE CCT or PSA is identified 
on Schedule D by the name and employer identification number of the CCT 
or PSA just as if it were a DFE, but the failure to file as a DFE is indicated 
by reporting a three-digit plan number of “000”. (Hence we refer to such a 
non-DFE indirect investment vehicle as a triple-zero CCT/PSA.) When a 
plan invests in a triple-zero CCT/PSA in conjunction with at least one true 
DFE, the probability of inconsistent filing increases. This makes sense due 
to the confusing mutually exclusive reporting rules applicable to DFE and 
non-DFE CCTs and PSAs, which is exacerbated by ambiguous terminology 
used on Schedule H.
165
 The other variables that increase the likelihood of 
being inconsistent all suggest a lack of competency or knowledge on the 
part of the filing plan. When the dollar amount in the category “Other 
Investments” is greater than two standard deviations above the mean, or 
when the calculated sum of all reported asset categories does not equal the 
reported sum of assets, the probability of an inconsistent filing increases. 
Finally, when the data in a Form 5500 had to be edited by hand (in the OPR 
editor) by the private contractor tasked with cleaning the data, this indicates 
some underlying problem in the Form 5500 itself. Such data problems are 
correlated with a higher probability of the inconsistencies which are the 
focus of our investigation.
166
 
Frozen plans (under which active employees accrue no additional 
benefits), more mature plans (meaning plans with a low ratio of active to 
total participants), and collectively bargained plans all have a lower 
 
 
164
 See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 
165
 The Schedule H balance sheet categories call for reports of the “Value of interest in 
common/collective trusts” and “Value of interest in pooled separate accounts” (lines 1(c)(9) 
and (10), respectively) without explicitly indicating that entries should be made only for 
CCTs and PSAs that file as DFEs. SCHEDULE H, supra note 35. That DFE limitation is set 
forth in the instructions to Form 5500 and Schedule H, but is not made clear on the Schedule 
itself. See 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9. 
 
166
 The private contractor does not clean data from Schedule H or Schedule D, just the 
Form 5500 itself. 
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probability of filing inconsistent returns.
167
 Also, plans with total 
participant direction have the lowest rate of inconsistent returns, followed 
by plans with partial participant direction. Plans with no participant 
direction (which is the baseline category) have a higher rate of inconsistent 
returns than those with either partial or total participant direction. 
While the regression output in Table 2 provides information on which 
variables are statistically significant and whether their effects are positive or 
negative, it does not immediately translate into intuition about the size of 
such effects and how they might operate in combination. Consequently, we 
provide graphical illustrations of how the overall predicted probability of 
filing an inconsistent return changes at different levels of several variables. 
For purposes of these graphs, any variables not listed are held at their 
median value and all point estimates are accompanied by ninety-five 
percent confidence intervals. 
Figure 24A illustrates how the probability of inconsistent filing 
predicted in the model changes with the level of total plan investment in 
DFEs at different discrete values of the accountant opinion variable. In all 
cases the probability of an inconsistent filing rises very slightly as total 
DFE investment increases. While reports filed with an accountant’s 
disclaimer are less likely to be inconsistent than those accompanied by an 
unqualified report, this difference is quite small. In addition, for larger 
dollar amounts of DFE investment the confidence intervals overlap, 
indicating that the small predictive effect of these two types of accountant 
opinions tends to disappear entirely as the level of DFE investment goes up. 
The most striking result is the substantial impact of not reporting an 
accountant opinion at all.
168
 Holding other variables at their median, this 
variable increases the likelihood of filing an inconsistent return from a 
range of ten to twenty percent range to around eighty percent. 
  
 
 
167
 The result for collectively bargained plans is somewhat surprising in light of the 
finding that collectively bargained DB plans that utilize DFEs and file consistent returns 
frequently fail to properly identify the DFEs in which they invest on Schedule D. See supra 
Figure 20 and text accompanying note 159. 
 
168
 The Schedule H instructions warn that “If the required accountant’s report is not 
attached to Form 5500, the filing is subject to rejection as incomplete and penalties may be 
assessed.” 2008 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 9, at 33. 
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Figure 24A: Predicted probability of inconsistent filing based on accountant 
opinions and total DFE investment, 2008 (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Next, Figure 24B sets forth the predicted probabilities for the modal 
plan in the data set together with a variety of comparable estimates in each 
of which one key variable takes on a different value. The modal plan is a 
defined contribution 401(k) profit-sharing plan that has an accountant 
opinion of “Disclaimer”, total participant direction, and the other 
dichotomous variables equal zero. When the continuous variables are set at 
their median, this modal case has a 0.08 probability of having an 
inconsistent return. The dotted line in Figure 24B is set at this level to 
facilitate comparisons with the modal case. Investing in at least one triple-
zero CCT/PSA and reporting non-zero imputed assets (which indicates 
discrepancy in the reported and calculated total assets) both substantially 
increase the probability of an inconsistent filing, making it much more 
likely than not. The effect of the other variables is considerably more 
modest. 
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Figure 24B: Predicted probability of inconsistent filing based on plan 
characteristics, 2008 (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
 Most of the different plan types are not statistically significant in the 
model. Different plan types are strongly associated with different values of 
some of the other variables, however. Therefore, merely considering the 
effect of plan type in isolation (while holding everything else constant) is 
unrealistic and misleading. Figure 24C presents the predicted probabilities 
for each different plan type determined by holding the other variables at the 
median for all plans of that same type. Rather than provide a direct 
comparison of the isolated effect of plan type, this presents a descriptive 
account of the estimated probability of filing an inconsistent report within 
each plan type. The most common plan is one variety of defined 
contribution plan, namely, a 401(k) profit-sharing plan (i.e., profit-sharing 
plan with an elective cash-or-deferred contribution feature). Since these 
three characteristics (DC, profit-sharing, and 401(k)) tend to co-occur, they 
are presented together. The difference between defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans is fairly substantial, and is actually the opposite of what 
might be expected. Table 2 shows that, ceteris paribus, classification as a 
defined benefit plan has a negative effect. Taking into account the likely 
values of other variables, however, a typical DB plan has nearly twice the 
probability of filing an inconsistent return (0.15) as a typical DC plan 
(0.08). The estimates for other plan types are less precise (because there are 
fewer data) and overall appear to be somewhat similar. 
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Figure 24C: Predicted probability of inconsistent filing for median case in each 
plan type, 2008 (with 95% confidence intervals) 
 
V.  FINANCIAL REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE POLICY 
Collective arrangements for the investment of pension funds yield 
important financial advantages in the form of enhanced diversification and 
reduced costs via economies of scale. The current system of simplified 
annual reporting, whereby a plan investing in a collective vehicle that 
qualifies as a direct filing entity (DFE) need only identify the entity and 
report the value of its interest therein, obscures pension plan investment 
allocations. While a fair picture of a plan’s overall portfolio composition, 
both direct and indirect (i.e., through DFEs), can in principle be pieced 
together by linking each DFE’s balance sheet to its investor-plans, that is a 
complicated and burdensome undertaking (as this study demonstrates). The 
results reported here suggest that pension plan sponsors have not in any 
widespread or systematic way utilized DFEs to hide the true nature of plan 
investments from participants or regulators. Yet they could, and even if the 
current reporting regime is not abused, reduced visibility blunts monitoring 
by interested parties. In a digitized world those risks and costs seem 
unwarranted. DFEs could send data showing each investor-plan’s share of 
the DFE’s assets and liabilities classified into the broad categories required 
by Schedule H, allowing each plan to transfer those amounts into the proper 
balance sheet lines for combination with the plan’s direct investments, 
rather than reporting indirect investments as an opaque undifferentiated 
lump (that is, identified only as an interest in an MTIA, CCT, PSA, or 103-
12 IE). To accommodate plans with different plan years, such reports might 
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need to be transmitted at the end of each month, but such data transmittal 
has negligible cost in an era of computerized recordkeeping and the 
internet. Simplified reporting on the plan’s Schedule H, although formerly 
necessitated by cost considerations, is no longer justifiable. A pension plan 
should be required to report the current value of the plan’s allocable portion 
of the underlying assets and liabilities of each DFE in which it invests, just 
as current regulations require itemized reporting of a plan’s interest in the 
assets and liabilities of a CCT or PSA that does not file as a DFE.
169
 
Linking DFE balance sheets to the investor-plans should be mandated. 
This simple step, however, is hardly enough. For the many large plans 
that delegate the investment of a large share of their assets to DFEs, the 
plan’s Schedule H information as currently reported is meaningless. But the 
truth is that the Schedule H balance sheet categories themselves are so 
antiquated and undifferentiated that proper allocation of DFE interests 
among those broad categories (i.e., abolishing simplified reporting as 
recommended above) is at best palliative. As observed earlier, the single 
Schedule H category “common stock” lumps together all plan holdings that 
formally consist of equity interests in incorporated entities, provided that 
the ownership interest does not entail priority rights to earnings or assets 
(i.e., is not preferred). Consequently, the reported value of common stock 
could be broadly diversified or concentrated in one or a few businesses, 
industries, or sectors; it encompasses ownership of both domestic and 
foreign enterprises; and it includes stock in companies that are closely held 
as well as shares subject to broad public trading. Likewise the “real estate” 
category offers no breakdown between improved and unimproved realty, 
nor does it provide any information concerning property location or 
relevant markets.
170
 Clearly, there is a disconnect between the breadth and 
formalism of the Schedule H categories and the substantive goals of 
disclosure — in most cases a pension plan’s balance sheet fails to convey a 
reliable picture of the risk and return characteristics of its investment 
portfolio.
171
 ERISA gives the Department of Labor authority to prescribe 
 
 
169
 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 
170
 See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 
171
 In a few instances Schedule H requires itemized reporting of investment positions 
that have distinctive and highly relevant financial characteristics. Most notably, interests in 
employer securities must be separately reported (distinct from the generic categories of 
common stock, preferred stock, and corporate debt), and U.S. government securities are also 
broken out. It should also be observed that the rise of participant-directed 401(k) plans has 
probably greatly improved the investment information available to DC plan participants 
because of the mutual fund information distributed under the rules of ERISA § 404(c), 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2012). 29 C.F.R. §§ 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2), 2550.404a-5 (2012). 
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more specific and financially relevant categories for the required statement 
of plan assets and liabilities,
172
 and clearly it should do so. 
It might be objected that enhanced Schedule H reporting is unnecessary 
and duplicative in light of the schedule of investment assets that large plans 
must submit as a component of their annual reports.
173
 That schedule is 
itemized and requires identification of the “issuer, borrower, or lessor, or 
similar party to the transaction (including a notation as to whether such 
party is known to be a party in interest), maturity date, rate of interest, 
collateral, par or maturity value, cost, and current value.”
174
 The schedule 
of investment assets is open to public inspection and available to a plan 
participant upon written request and payment of the cost of copying.
175
 
While the schedule of investment assets provides detail that is entirely 
lacking in the Schedule H balance sheet as currently constituted, it is 
woefully inadequate as a substitute for a revitalized Schedule H. The 
schedule of investment assets does not have to be provided to plan 
participants without charge (unlike the Schedule H contents).
176
 Apart from 
cost, two further deficiencies render the schedule of investment assets 
inadequate to the task of supplying financially useful information. First, the 
itemized schedule supplies too much undigested detail to be useful to plan 
participants; information overload makes it likely that the list would be 
dismissed out of hand. Second — and most important — the schedule of 
investment assets is not required to be submitted in a format that supports 
 
 
172
 The statute demands that the annual report include a statement of assets and 
liabilities “aggregated by categories and valued at their current value,” ERISA 
§ 103(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(A) (2012), but ERISA does not specify the 
categories. That task was left to the implementing regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2520.103-1(b)(1) 
(2012), which requires large plans to report the financial information called for by Form 
5500 Schedule H and the instructions thereto. Because ERISA grants the Secretary of Labor 
express authority to prescribe forms and to promulgate regulations to carry out ERISA title I, 
only administrative action is needed to compel more functional and informative balance 
sheet reporting. ERISA §§ 109(a) (authority to prescribe forms), 505 (regulations), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1029(a), 1135 (2012). 
 
173
 See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-1(b)(1), -10, -11 (2012). These regulations 
implement ERISA § 103(b)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(C) (2012). 
 
174
 ERISA § 103(b)(3)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1023(b)(3)(C) (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2520.103-
10 (2012). 
 
175
 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 
176
 Compare items 3 and 9 listed under “Your Rights to Additional Information” in 29 
C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d)(3) (2012), which provide that a pension plan’s schedule of 
investment assets and information relating to DFEs in which the plan participates may be 
obtained upon request and payment of copying costs, with the penultimate paragraph of the 
same subsection, which provides that the Schedule H balance sheet information can be 
obtained without charge. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-10(d)(3) (2012). 
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routine electronic data capture.
177
 This format limitation means that 
government regulators, financial analysts, unions, and other interested 
parties are not equipped with the information that would be necessary to 
conduct broad-based statistical analysis of benefit plan portfolios. While the 
facts of a particular plan’s investments are open to inspection, one cannot 
evaluate whether a plan is an outlier or poses special risks to its participants 
(or to the PBGC insurance system) unless comparative data are available in 
a form that allows computer processing. 
ERISA demands access to detailed pension plan financial information, 
but access should not be equated with meaningful ability to assess the 
information. The policy goals of financial disclosure — to deter 
misconduct, facilitate enforcement, and give workers information they need 
to make better (more efficient) personal career and financial planning 
decisions
178
 — depend for their accomplishment on a meaningful ability to 
assess plan financial data. Those goals are not well served by a system that 
makes workers and regulators guess whether the structure of a particular 
plan portfolio poses special risks, or whether any such risk is adequately 
compensated. 
There are important sticking points, of course. Consider the 
administrative challenge: given the enormous range of characteristics of 
investment properties, how construct a uniform comprehensive system of 
digitized investment reporting? Some cases are straightforward. Ticker 
symbols could be used for publicly traded stocks and corporate bonds. 
Government bonds could be identified by the issuer (jurisdiction), date of 
issue, and maturity date. Real estate might be classified as undeveloped, 
agricultural, industrial, commercial, or residential rental, with an indication 
of each parcel’s location (within the U.S., perhaps using metropolitan 
statistical areas), and where appropriate the number of units (or acreage) 
and occupancy rate. Debt or equity interests in privately-held businesses 
present special difficulties; business name, headquarters address, principal 
business location (metropolitan statistical area), and principal business 
activity (perhaps using North American Industry Classification System 
codes) might all be necessary identifiers. Options would be identified with 
reference to the underlying property (such as stock or real estate), duration, 
conditions on exercise, and strike price. Derivatives and synthetic financial 
products (e.g., mortgage-backed securities and other collateralized debt 
obligations) pose a conundrum; some mechanism for reporting maximum 
loss exposure would be desirable, as would an indication of whether the 
 
 
177
 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 
178
 See WIEDENBECK, supra note 22, at 14–16, 57–58. 
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instrument is held for purposes of hedging, speculation, or arbitrage. 
Political resistance may present an even greater obstacle than technical 
feasibility. To provide meaningful ability to assess plan financial 
information, comparison with representative (not necessarily 
comprehensive) pension investment data is essential. Individual participants 
are not going to engage in sophisticated financial analysis of their 
retirement plans; instead, disclosure policy should aim to empower outside 
monitors to represent their interests. Such outside monitors can include the 
Department of Labor, the PBGC (in the case of insured defined benefit 
plans), and unions representing covered employees. Unfortunately, 
empowering outside monitors creates the threat of encouraging outside 
meddlers. The prospect of offering ammunition to plaintiff-side class action 
litigation firms, disclosing investment strategy to competitors, or dropping 
clues that might facilitate reverse engineering of hedge fund proprietary 
trading models, would make employers see red. The outside meddlers 
concern (the risk that plan financial information will be misused) is 
longstanding — it can be traced back to the earliest federal foray into 
financial disclosure. It formed the principal ground for opposition to the 
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act in 1958, to its strengthening in 
1962, and to its replacement in 1974 with ERISA’s more robust disclosure 
regime.
179
 It is a concern that deserves to be studied and taken seriously. 
 
 
179
 In 1958 business leaders and Republican legislators attempted to limit coverage of the 
WPPDA to jointly-managed Taft-Hartley plans, exempting single-employer defined benefit 
pension plans from mandatory disclosure. They contended that fiduciary abuses had been 
uncovered only in the operation of multiemployer plans. Because the company sponsoring a 
single-employer defined benefit plan (then referred to as “level-of-benefits plans”) bears the risk 
of underfunding, the employer has a strong incentive to monitor and properly manage the fund, 
rendering disclosure to participants unnecessary. Moreover, they asserted that disclosure of 
funding levels and investment information would be harmful, because the information would be 
misused, particularly by unions seeking wage and benefit increases, and that the resulting 
bargaining pressure would discourage adequate funding. “Where there has been no testimony of 
abuse and where it is conceded by almost everyone that this type of plan is not susceptible to 
abuse, it seems to me we have no right to legislate away confidential information which in the 
hands of unions would create a whipsaw at the bargain table between management and labor.” 104 
CONG. REC. 16,439 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Bosch), reprinted in WPPDA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 370. Accord H.R. REP. NO. 85-2283, at 23-25 (1958) (minority views 
assert that a “great deal of harm could result from requiring disclosure of minute details of finance 
by a level-of-benefits plan. Such a requirement might shift the bargaining emphasis away from 
benefits and [facilitate] a whipsawing technique by unions.”), reprinted in WPPDA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 376-78. The specter of social investing was also raised: “Disclosure of 
the volume and distribution of investments of level-of-benefits plans will also inevitably 
culminate in those parties not responsible for providing the benefits to demand a voice in 
determining the type of investments to be made.” Id. 
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Clearly, a disclosure regime that induces pension plan sponsors to switch in 
and out of investments shortly before and after the required reporting date 
in an effort to prevent questionable or illegitimate use of particularized plan 
investment information is worse than useless. That response might hide 
sensitive information from perceived meddlers, but it would generate large 
transaction costs and destroy the utility of investment information to outside 
monitors as well, defeating the purposes of disclosure. Perhaps complete 
digitized investment data should be made available only to the Department 
of Labor, the Service, and PBGC, with data sets stripped of all sponsor 
identifying information released to the public only on a delayed basis.
180
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Department of Labor routinely compiles and publishes aggregate 
statistics derived from summary financial information filed annually by 
large private pension plans, and the plan level data are publicly-available, 
yet that information is all virtually meaningless. The data reveal that a large 
portion of private pension plan assets — more than sixty percent in the case 
 
These arguments for exempting single-employer defined benefit plans from financial 
disclosure were renewed and persistently promoted in connection with congressional 
consideration of the 1962 amendments to WPPDA. To Amend the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act: Hearing on S. 1994 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and 
Public Welfare, 87th Cong. 18 (1961) (prepared statement of Secretary of Labor Arthur 
Goldberg); id. at 29-34 (extended colloquy between Sen. Goldwater and Department of Labor 
officials); id. at 44-47 (prepared statement of Sen. Allott) (including concerns over divulging 
investment practices to competitors and pressure for social investing); see supra note 17. 
Proposals for more detailed disclosure of investment information also drew fire during the 
early development of the pension reform proposals that evolved into ERISA. See PRESIDENT’S 
COMM. ON CORP. PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE RET. & WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC 
POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS 77-79 (1965) (Cabinet committee recommends 
detailed disclosure); WOOTEN, supra note 11 at 123-24, 127-28 (objections to more stringent 
disclosure). 
 
180
 Even stripped of sponsor identifying information, a complete plan-level investment report 
might be easily associated with the corresponding simplified Schedule H balance sheet, which of 
course is not anonymous. But the Schedule H report (founded, as it is, on largely dysfunctional 
categories) would become unnecessary under a regime of standardized comprehensive digital 
reporting. Granting participants a right of access to the complete financial data pertaining to their 
own plans seems appropriate, but once released to participants such sponsor-identified data might 
be disseminated to others, and over time many sponsors in the publicly released data set might be 
identified. To counteract that erosion of anonymity, the arbitrary identifier assigned to each plan 
in the publicly released data set might be changed annually, but that measure would hinder plan-
specific longitudinal studies by scholars and other private-sector analysts. Suffice it to say that 
devising an effective mechanism to keep sponsor identifying information out of the hands of 
outside meddlers is no simple task. 
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of defined benefit plans — is held by various indirect investment vehicles 
(known as direct filing entities) whose portfolios are functionally invisible. 
Thanks to the failure to systematically link returns filed by direct filing 
entities with the pension plans that invest through them, the overall pattern 
of pension plan investments, direct and indirect, is unknown. This article 
describes a project to carry out such linking (insofar as the quality of the 
raw data permits) and reports the results. 
The linked results confirm that there are large differences in the 
composition of defined benefit and defined contribution plan investments. 
Certain plan subtypes also exhibit distinctive asset allocations, such as 
ESOPs among DC plans. Interestingly, others do not: cash balance plan 
holdings mirror those of traditional DB pension plans, for example. Once 
DFE interests are properly categorized and attributed to investor-plans, the 
overall asset allocation of the investor-plans generally looks quite like the 
portfolio makeup of plans of the same type and asset level that do not invest 
through DFEs. When plans that are the product of collective bargaining are 
compared with those that are not, most holdings appear similar, but 
collectively-bargained DB plans have a curious propensity to fail to 
adequately identify DFEs in which they invest. Many plans using DFEs file 
internally inconsistent returns that preclude successful linking of DFE 
financial information to the investor-plan (about thirty-five percent in 
2008), and a regression analysis reveals several plan characteristics 
associated with such deficient filings. 
This study brings to light a great deal of heretofore inaccessible data 
concerning private pension plan finances. Yet when these results are 
evaluated in light of the purposes of pension plan financial disclosure, 
serious deficiencies remain. Even routine, accurate, and comprehensive 
matching of DFE financial information with investor-plans does little to 
inform plan participants or government regulators of the risk and return 
characteristics of a specific plan, because the asset and liability categories 
governing electronic data submission are far too broad and formalistic. 
When “common stock” of all sorts is lumped together, for example, we 
learn nothing about the marketability of the equity interests that comprise 
that category, nor is the industry, geographical concentration, or 
capitalization of the corporations revealed, much less the diversification of 
the portfolio as a whole. ERISA’s text and policies support the regulatory 
formulation of a far more detailed digital disclosure regime.
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 The research protocol and the complete results of this study, including summary 
spreadsheets showing the aggregate portfolio composition of various categories of large single-
employer pension plans and multi-color versions of the figures, are available as a web appendix. 
